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Articles
THE COST OF RAISING A KILLER—PARENTAL LIABILITY FOR THE
PARENTS OF ADULT MASS MURDERERS
SHAUNDRA K. LEWIS*
“People never really recover from the death of a child.  How much
more difficult, then, is it to deal with the deaths of other children
whom your child has killed? . . .  So much shame surrounds the issue of
mental illness that many parents don’t seek help for their kids or are
afraid to talk about it publicly. . . . [T]hat needs to change.”1
INTRODUCTION
ONE simply cannot ignore the significant number of mass shootingscontinuing to occur in places one would least expect gun violence to
erupt.2  In the last seven years, there has been a shooting rampage at a
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1. Belinda Luscombe, Elliot Rodger’s Parents Break Silence on Shooting, TIME
(May 29, 2014), http://time.com/136764/elliot-rodger-parents/ [https://perma
.cc/HK4X-ZP2V].
2. Shaundra K. Lewis, Firearm Laws Redux–Legislative Proposals for Disarming the
Mentally Ill Post-Heller and Newtown, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 320, 323 (2014)
(observing that “public mass shootings are now ubiquitous in America”).  Accord-
ing to a recent FBI report, from 2000 to 2013, there were approximately 160 active
mass shooter incidents across America, including “in urban and rural areas, and in
40 of 50 states and the District of Columbia.”  J. PETE BLAIR & KATHERINE W.
SCHWEIT, TEX. STATE UNIV. & FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF ACTIVE
SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013, at 8 (2014),
(1)
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grocery store,3 movie theater,4 elementary school,5 and even a church.6
Far too often, the shooter displayed clear signs of mental illness prior to
their murderous attack,7 inevitably leading many to ponder whether the
shooter’s parents were partially to blame.8  Were they too permissive?
Were they not loving enough?  Were they aware of their child’s deranged
state and had a responsibility to protect the public?  Do they have a duty to
supervise an adult, mentally ill child?  At the very least, should parents
warn the proper authorities about their potentially deadly kin?
The quintessential example raising these issues is the case of Adam
Lanza’s single mother, Nancy Lanza.  Ms. Lanza’s twenty-year-old son uti-
lized her firearms to inexplicably gun down twenty school-children and six
educators at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, in
2012.9  At the time of the massacre, her son, who had a significant history
of mental illness, resided with her in her large suburban home where, to
the bewilderment of many, she stockpiled an arsenal of firearms—includ-
ing a very powerful semi-automatic rifle.10  Notwithstanding Adam’s
mental health issues, Ms. Lanza gave him unfettered access to her legally
purchased the weaponry.11  In fact, when the police searched the Lanzas’
available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/office-of-partner-engagement/active-
shooter-incidents/a-study-of-active-shooter-incidents-in-the-u.s.-2000-2013 [https:/
/perma.cc/R9DG-7AC3].
3. See Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Ter-
rorists?: Race, Religion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 33,
50 (2013).
4. See Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45
CONN. L. REV. 813, 823 (2013).
5. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 322.
6. See Manhunt on for South Carolina Church Gunman, CBSNEWS (June 18, 2015,
10:21 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/9-dead-in-shooting-in-historic-black-
south-carolina-church/ [https://perma.cc/Q898-XYK3]; see also BLAIR & SCHWEIT,
supra note 2, at 8 (averaging 16.4 active shooter incidents occurring from
2007–2013 in various places—including city streets, health care facilities, and
houses of worship—which is more than double the number of such incidents from
2000–2006, when an average of only 6.4 such incidents occurred annually).
7. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 324, 325–38 (noting “the all too familiar storyline
behind nearly every shooting spree, prior to the shootings, the gunman exhibited
clear signs of mental illness[ ]”).
8. See, e.g., Garance Franke-Ruta, What About the Parents?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 10,
2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/01/what-about-the-par
ents/69176/ [perma.cc/4JZZ-LAXZ]; Is Nancy Lanza to Blame for Her Son’s Actions,
DEBATE.ORG, http://www.debate.org/opinions/is-nancy-lanza-to-blame-for-her-
sons-actions [https://perma.cc/K2H4-BX24] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) (citing
online poll where 89% of respondents blame Nancy Lanza for Adam Lanza’s
shooting rampage at Sandy Hook Elementary School).
9. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 322.
10. STEPHEN J. SEDENSKY III, STATE OF CONN. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RE-
PORT OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY ON THE
SHOOTINGS AT SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND 36 YOGANANDA STREET, NEW-
TOWN, CONNECTICUT ON DECEMBER 14, 2012, at 28, 36 (2013).
11. See id. at 28 (observing Adam lived alone with his mother).  A search of
the Lanza home after the shooting rampage revealed a gun locker intact that had
2
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home, they discovered a check Ms. Lanza had given her son for Christmas
to purchase his own gun.12  Moreover, Ms. Lanza frequently took her son
to shooting ranges,13 despite an unconfirmed report that she was contem-
plating having him involuntarily committed to a psychiatric institution
around the same time of the shootings.14  Unfortunately, Ms. Lanza paid
the ultimate price for this lapse in parental judgment with her own life, as
her son shot and killed her before embarking on his elementary school
killing spree.15  Nevertheless, this did not stop the Sandy Hook victims’
loved ones from suing Nancy Lanza’s estate for wrongful death,16 raising
the question of whether a parent can be civilly liable for a mass shooting
committed by their adult offspring under general common law negligence
principles.
This Article is the first to explore this issue in great detail, using
Nancy Lanza and other parents of notorious shooters as examples.  Specif-
ically, this Article attempts to evaluate, clarify, and build upon parental
negligence law.  Part I discusses the evolution of parental liability.  Part II
addresses whether there can be parental liability for parents of adult mass
shooters based upon a special relationship.  Part III provides an overview
of negligence in general and its complexities, as well as exploring whether
a duty to protect or warn can be established in mass shooting cases.  Part
IV examines whether the parents in the real-life examples breached a duty
to protect or warn.  Part V analyzes whether the aforementioned parents’
breach caused the shooting victims’ injury or death.  Part VI concludes
that in some circumstances parents can and should be held liable for neg-
ligence that leads to their child committing a mass killing.  It further sub-
mits that the mere possibility of parents being subjected to financial
liability for their child’s mass shooting will not only incentivize parents to
take more aggressive measures to keep firearms out of their mentally ill
not been broken  into—the inference being that Adam had access to his mother’s
arsenal and did not forcibly steal her weapons. See Bill Cummings, Ken Dixon &
John Pirro, Lanza’s Secret Arsenal: Swords, Guns and 1,400 Rounds of Ammo, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 28, 2013, 9:05 PM, http://www.chron.com/news/nation-world/arti
cle/Lanza-s-secret-arsenal-swords-guns-and-1-400-4393243.php [https://perma.cc/
6TNK-KBEF].
12. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28.
13. See id. at 31; see also Cummings et al., supra note 11; Matt Flegenheimer &
Ravi Somaiya, A Mother, a Gun Enthusiast and the First Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/nyregion/friends-of-gunmans-
mother-his-first-victim-recall-her-as-generous.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/U42J-
5638].
14. See Jana Winter, Exclusive: Fear of Being Committed May Have Caused Connecti-
cut Gunman to Snap, FOXNEWS (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/
2012/12/18/fear-being-committed-may-have-caused-connecticut-madman-to-
snap/ [https://perma.cc/M57Q-DLNH].
15. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 322.
16. Dave Altimari, 11th Sandy Hook Family Files Wrongful Death Claim Notice,
HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 10, 2014, 11:10 AM, http://www.courant.com/news/
connecticut/hc-sandy-hook-shooting-parents-may-sue-p-20141208-story.html
[https://perma.cc/BF34-K4FU].
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child’s hands, but to obtain the mental health assistance their child so
desperately needs—measures that in the end will make everyone safer.  Fi-
nally, Part VI provides advice to parents for dealing with significantly men-
tally ill, adult children residing in their home.
I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PARENTAL LIABILITY
As explained in more detail below, while in early American history
parents generally were not personally liable for their children’s torts, the
law has evolved over time such that parents can now be held civilly respon-
sible for their offspring’s actions under certain circumstances, even for a
criminal attack like a mass shooting.
A. Early Common Law on Parental Liability
Originally, under early common law, parents could not be found vi-
cariously liable for their child’s torts solely because of their parent-child
relationship.17  Children were considered separate legal entities responsi-
ble for their own torts, and any judgment had to be satisfied by them per-
sonally, which left most victims uncompensated since children are usually
insolvent and cannot satisfy a judgment.18  Parents were only responsible
for their children’s actions if the parents themselves were somehow inde-
pendently negligent by, for example, entrusting a minor child with a dan-
gerous weapon.19
B. Parental Liability Statutes
To both address the problem of victims going uncompensated for
property damage or personal injuries caused by children and to deter juve-
nile delinquency, every state enacted some form of a parental liability stat-
17. See, e.g., Alioto v. Marnell, 520 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Mass. 1988) (noting
that one’s parental status, without more, does not impose duty to supervise and
control emancipated adult children); Guzy v. Gandel, 229 A.2d 809, 810 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (declaring “[t]he mere existence of the relationship of
parent and child does not render a parent liable for his child’s torts”); Childers v.
A.S., 909 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (agreeing that “the mere fact of
paternity or maternity does not make a parent liable to third parties for the torts of
his or her minor child and that generally, minors are civilly liable for their own
torts”); see also Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64
ALA. L. REV. 533, 555 (2013); Joan Morgridge, Comment, When Does Parental Liabil-
ity End?: Holding Parents Liable for the Acts of Their Adult Children, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
335, 336 (1990).
18. See Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2000) (citing W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 123 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Morgridge,
supra note 17, at 336.
19. See B.C. Ricketts, Validity & Construction of Statutes Making Parents Liable for
Torts Committed by Their Minor Children, 8 A.L.R.3d 612 § 1[a] (1966); see also Kamin-
ski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048, 1051 (Conn. 1990) (noting “[a]t common
law, the torts of children do not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua par-
ents, although parental liability may be created by statute, or by independently
negligent behavior on the part of parents” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
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ute that permitted plaintiffs to sue parents for their child’s actions,
regardless of any wrongdoing on the parents’ part.20  The different varia-
tions of parental liability statutes include some permitting vicarious liabil-
ity for property damage only, some for personal injury, others permitting
both, and some covering only damage to school property.21
Clearly, these statutes were enacted in derogation of common
law, because they premise liability on the parent-child relationship
itself—presuming that if parents could themselves be sued, they will be
encouraged to control their children and prevent juvenile delinquency.22
Thus, this is the first time that the law tacitly recognized that parents have
some obligation to supervise or control their youth so as to prevent them
from harming others or others’ property.
The problem with parental liability statutes, however, is that even
though the statutes were purportedly created to compensate innocent vic-
tims by allowing them to go after the parents with deeper pockets than
their children,23 these statutes severely capped the amount of monetary
recovery.  In some jurisdictions, financial recovery is limited to as little as
$250–$500.24  Because of these low caps, scholars have recognized that
parental liability statutes were not truly intended to compensate the vic-
tims, but to penalize the parents.25  Nevertheless, the overwhelming ma-
jority of courts have found parental liability statutes constitutional because
the statutes are reasonably related to the legitimate state interest of reduc-
ing juvenile delinquency.26
20. See Morgridge, supra note 17, at 337.
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.24 (2015) (allowing a person to sue parents of
child under eighteen who “maliciously or willfully destroys or steals property” of
another); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 225 (2016) (“Parents are responsible for damage
occasioned by their child as provided by law.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-3 (West
2015) (making parents or guardians liable for property damage done to school
property); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.09(b) (West 2015) (creating cause of ac-
tion and compensatory award of up to $10,000 against parents or guardians for
their minor child’s willful damage to another’s property).
22. See Morgridge, supra note 17, at 337; see also Distinctive Printing & Packag-
ing Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Neb. 1989) (noting that “[s]ome courts have
held that where parental liability statutes limit liability, the statutory purpose must
be only to deter juvenile delinquency, not to compensate victims”).
23. See Morgridge, supra note 17, at 337.
24. See Ricketts, supra note 19.
25. See id.
26. See James Lockhart, Cause of Action Under Parental Liability Statute for Tort
Committed by Minor Child, 19 CAUSES ACTION 1st 271 § 12 (1989 & Supp. 2015);
Laura Pfeiffer, Note, To Enhance or Not to Enhance: Civil Penalty Enhancement for Par-
ents of Juvenile Hate Crime Offenders, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1685, 1716 (2007) (noting
parental liability statutes “resemble a form of strict liability because the parents are
liable regardless of whether they acted reasonably”).  At least one court has held
that for parental liability statutes to be constitutional, compensation for injuries
caused by minor children must be capped to avoid limitless liability for parents
who may not be at fault for their child’s conduct. See Corley v. Lewless, 182 S.E.2d
766, 770 (Ga. 1971) (holding Georgia statute permitting parents to be sued for
property damage or personal injury caused by their minor child without any caps
5
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C. Sections 316 and 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
To address the concern that parental liability statutes failed to ade-
quately compensate victims suffering personal injuries committed by a
child, Section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was created to
provide a cause of action for parental negligence.27  Under common law
negligence claims, there are no caps.28  This Restatement has been
adopted by many state courts and serves as the basis for negligent supervi-
sion and “negligent entrustment of a dangerous weapon to a child” law-
suits.29  Section 316 provides:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control.30
Subsection B’s requirement that the parent “know of the necessity” to
control the child apparently means that the parent must have some reason
to believe their child is dangerous and poses a risk to others.  Parental
liability lawsuits based upon Section 316’s theory of negligent supervision,
often fail, however, because regardless of how disorderly or strange a
child’s behavior is at home, rarely would parents have the foresight that
this behavior would manifest itself into the murdering of others.31  This
then poses an obstacle in trying to hold parents liable for their child’s
violent, criminal acts, including a mass killing.
Additionally, Section 316’s application is restricted to parents of minor
children, providing no recourse when a child who has reached the age of
majority commits the violent attack.32  This restriction makes it difficult
on amount of recovery violated Due Process Clause because, it would “authorize a
recovery without liability, and would compel payment without fault” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); see also Distinctive Printing, 443 N.W.2d at 572 (upholding
constitutionality of parental liability statute that permitted full compensation for
property damage intentionally committed by children residing with them but limit-
ing compensatory damages for intentional personal injury to $1,000 per person,
on grounds statute did not violate Equal Protection Clause because there was ra-
tional basis for classification: property damage happens more frequently and legis-
lature might have wanted to incentivize parents to better control their children).
27. See Morgridge, supra note 17, at 338.
28. See id.
29. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parent Liability for the Intentional Acts of Their Chil-
dren Under Common Law Negligence Theories and Parental Responsibility Statutes, 230
EDUC. L. REP. 469, 471–72 (2008).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
31. See Mawdsley, supra note 29, at 473.
32. See, e.g., Carney v. Gambel, 751 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(refusing to hold parents responsible for their “emancipated, adult child[’s]” con-
6
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for a plaintiff to invoke Section 316 to hold the parents of a mass shooter
responsible for a shooting rampage because most mass shooters are
adults.33  To get around this obstacle, some plaintiffs began invoking Sec-
tion 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to establish a parent’s duty
to control their adult offspring.  Section 319 provides:
[o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or
should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control
the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.34
Plaintiffs have alleged that parents who permit their adult children to re-
side with them “take charge” over the child and thus have a duty to control
them.35
Courts, however, have repeatedly rejected this as a legitimate basis for
imposing a duty on a parent to control their adult offspring, absent a
court order or other legal process expressly making the parents the adult-
child’s legal custodian.36  For example, in Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield,37
the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the defendant police officer’s
counterclaim, premised upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section
319, that the parents of an adult male, who seriously wounded him with an
axe, had a duty to control their adult, paranoid schizophrenic son.38  In
rejecting the defendant’s counterclaim, the court observed that reported
cases had only imposed a duty to control pursuant to Section 319 where
professional custodians or institutions had formal, legal custody of the
tortfeasor, such as in the case of an individual placed in the care of a
hospital or under the supervision of a prison warden.39  The court further
pointed out that, at that time, no court had ever held that a parent who
duct, noting “where a special relationship has been found imposing liability on a
parent for conduct of a child, the duty to exercise control is limited to a minor
child”).
33. See Mark B. Melter, The Kids Are Alright; It’s The Grown-Ups Who Scare Me: A
Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GONZ. J. INT’L
L. 33, 39 (2012) (observing that “roughly 80% of all mass murderers are aged
between 20 and 50 years old. . . . men make up 94% of all mass murderers, and
63% of offenders are white”).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319.
35. See, e.g., Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048, 1051 (Conn. 1990).
36. See id.; see also Lott v. Goodkind, 867 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (disagreeing that Section 319 can be utilized as basis to impose duty on
parents to control adult children, reasoning “[l]iability of the type described in
section 319 has typically been imposed on persons having someone committed to
their legal custody, such as a jailer or superintendent of a residential institution
which has the ability to control the actions of its residents”); Blevins v. Hartman,
Nos. 12CA116, 12CA115, 2013 WL 3936039, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. July 18, 2013).
37. 578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990).
38. See id. at 1050–51.
39. See id. at 1051–52.
7
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had made a home for an adult, mentally ill child had taken charge of that
person within the meaning Section 319.40
Similarly, in Knight v. Merhige,41 a Florida appellate court recently re-
affirmed that Section 319 does not provide a basis for imposing a duty on
parents to control an adult child, stressing that “the ‘take charge’ require-
ment of section 319 has generally been limited to ‘the context of profes-
sional custodians with special competence to control the behavior of those
in their charge,’” like jailers or superintendents of residential institu-
tions.42  In Knight, the adult son shot and killed four relatives at a
Thanksgiving family gathering.43  The court held that providing financial
assistance to their son (who did not reside with them) and controlling
whether he attended family gatherings was insufficient to place the adult
son “within the functional equivalent of their ‘legal custody.’”44
D. A Special Relationship
Thus, in the absence of any statute or Restatement provision explicitly
permitting parental liability for an adult child, courts have been divided as
to whether a parent can be held accountable for their emancipated off-
spring’s miscreant acts.  Part of this division is based upon the well-settled
common law principle that no one has a duty to protect others from dan-
gers posed by third parties—or a duty to control or warn a third party to
prevent harm to others—unless they have a special relationship with ei-
ther the victim or the perpetrator.45  Since, as used in this Article, mass or
rampage shootings refers to the random shootings of people, the parents of
the shooter likely will not have a special relationship with the victims.
Thus, the only way a parent can be held accountable for a mass shooting
committed by their child is if the courts recognize a special relationship
between the adult shooter and their parent—something most courts have
been reluctant to conclude, because parents have no legal duty to control
their emancipated offspring.46
For example, in Carney v. Gambel,47 a Florida appellate court held that
the parents of an adult child who assaulted the head of security in the
country club community where the parents and adult child lived did not
have a special relationship with their adult child and thus did not have a
40. See id. at 1052.
41. 133 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
42. See id. at 1146–47 (quoting Kaminski, 578 A.2d at 1051).
43. See id. at 1143.
44. See id. at 1142, 1147.
45. See id. at 1145; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
46. See e.g., Hartsock v. Hartsock, 592 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (App. Div. 1993) (“No
justification exists [ ] for imposing liability on parents for the conduct of their
emancipated, adult child.  Inasmuch as parents have no legal right to control their
adult child’s activities, they cannot be held liable for those activities.” (citations
omitted)).
47. 751 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
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duty to control his conduct.48  In so holding, the court reasoned that in
order to have a special relationship with their adult offspring, the parents
had to have the right or ability to control his conduct, and parents have no
legal right to control an emancipated, adult child.49  The court further
emphasized that parental liability had been limited to cases involving a
minor child.50  However, the court left open the possibility for parental
liability to incur for an adult child where the adult child is insane or men-
tally deficient, citing to Thorne v. Ramirez.51
Similarly, in Grover v. Stechel,52 a New Mexico appellate court con-
cluded that no special relationship existed between a mother and her
adult son who had stabbed the plaintiff.  The court reasoned that the
mother lived across the country from her adult son when the assault hap-
pened, and it was too much of a logical leap to find that, by merely assist-
ing her adult son financially, she had the ability to control his conduct.53
The court further explained that without the right or ability to control
another’s conduct, no duty to control could arise.54
In both of these cases, although the courts did not specifically refer-
ence Section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, they apparently
incorporated Section 316’s ability-to-control consideration in their analy-
ses to determine whether there was a special relationship between the par-
ents and their adult offspring.  In these cases, the courts found the parents
lacked the ability to control their emancipated offspring because either
(1) the child had obtained the age of majority and had no mental illness,
as in the Carney case; or (2) the parents did not have the opportunity to
control the adult because the adult child did not reside with them, as in
the Grover case.  As demonstrated by the next few case illustrations, how-
ever, where these conditions do not exist, parental liability for adult chil-
dren could attach.
For instance, contrary to the Carney and Grover cases, in Silberstein v.
Cordie,55 a Minnesota court held that the defendant-parents had a special
relationship with their schizophrenic, twenty-seven-year-old son who re-
sided with them.56  In that case, the parents knew their son was delusional
and nonverbal, had hallucinations about the devil and beasts, and had
threatened to harm the victim in the past while suffering from delusions.57
48. See id. at 654.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.; see also Thorne v. Ramirez, 346 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
52. 45 P.3d 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).
53. See id. at 84.
54. See id.
55. 474 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. granted in part, cause remanded by 477
N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1991).
56. See id. at 856–57.
57. See id. at 852.
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In fact, the mother had her son involuntarily committed to a mental
healthcare facility prior to the incident in question.58  Four months after
the son was released from involuntary commitment, the son moved in with
his parents, and the parents noticed he had stopped taking his medica-
tion.59  Nevertheless, the parents traveled out of town, leaving their 12-
gauge shotgun readily accessible to him.60  The son used the gun to kill
his friend whom he believed was in collusion with the devil.61  In recogniz-
ing the parents had a special relationship with their adult son, the court
stressed that months before the murder, the mother assumed responsibil-
ity for her son’s day-to-day care, and the son’s mental condition “was like
that of a child . . . .”62
Similarly, in Frederic v. Willoughby,63 an Ohio court determined that a
special relationship existed between parents and their mentally disturbed
adult offspring who resided in the same household.64  There, the adult
son sexually assaulted the plaintiff while her four-year-old daughter lied
next to her in the bed.65  Prior to this incident, the father had struck his
son in the head after the son had broken into the plaintiff’s house and
masturbated with a pair of her underwear.66  The court explained that a
“special relation” exists between a parent and an adult child when the par-
ent either “has accepted such responsibility in a legally recognized way,
such as a guardianship, or in a situation where an adult child’s dependence and
the parent’s overt acceptance of responsibility for the adult child establish a de facto
guardianship.”67
In determining whether there was a de facto guardianship, the court
considered whether the perpetrator posed a risk to others; whether the
parents were aware of the perpetrator’s mental condition and the risk he
posed to others; and whether the parents accepted responsibility for their
son-perpetrator’s actions and took charge of him.68  In finding that the
parents were aware of their son’s mental condition and posed a risk to
others, the court highlighted that the parents knew their son was “not
right,” had violent criminal convictions including for a sexual battery on a
blind woman and domestic violence, and was drawing Social Security ben-
efits for his mental illness since his illness prevented him from working.69
Additionally, the parents were aware their son posed a risk to others be-
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 856.
61. See id. at 852–53.
62. See id.
63. No. 2007-P-0084, 2008 WL 2582593, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 2008).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at *1–2.
67. See id. at *5 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. See id.
69. See id. at *5–6.
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cause they adopted his son (their grandson) and raised him in their resi-
dence upstairs to protect the grandson from their son, who lived
downstairs in the basement.70
The court held there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine
whether the parents assumed responsibility for the perpetrator and took
charge of him.71  That included evidence that the parents bailed the child
out of jail; attended his court hearings; paid for his legal expenses and
vasectomy; confiscated the perpetrator’s keys to prevent him from leaving
the house late at night; drove him to see a counselor; monitored him
closely by restricting him from leaving their property; beat the perpetrator
for masturbating in the neighbor’s house; and, after the first masturbation
incident, told the plaintiff-victim to contact them if she had any additional
problems with their son.72  The court noted that all of this evidence not
only was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant-parents owed
a duty to the plaintiff neighbor, but that they breached the duty, and the
breach was the proximate cause of the neighbor’s rape.73
Finally, in Smith v. Freund,74 a California appellate court found that a
special relationship existed between a nineteen-year-old mentally dis-
turbed man and his parents, but ultimately decided the parents owed no
special relationship-based duty to the victims because their son’s criminal
act was unforeseeable.75  In Smith, the plaintiffs alleged that the parents
negligently supervised their nineteen-year-old son, who shot and killed
their immediate family members.76  At the time of the shootings, the adult
son lived with his parents, and they were aware he had been diagnosed
with a major depressive disorder with psychotic features, Asperger’s Syn-
drome, and attention deficit disorder.77  In the past, the son had flown
into violent rages and attacked his parents.78  The plaintiffs argued the
parents had a special relationship with their son, notwithstanding that he
was an adult, because he “was autistic and lived with his parents in the
same way as a minor child,” and thus they had the ability to control and
monitor him.79  The appellate court agreed, reiterating that a defendant
has a duty to take affirmative action for the protection of another if a
special relationship exists between the defendant and the person whose
conduct needs to be controlled.80  Most importantly, the court held that a
“parent and child is one such special relationship,” and “[a]nother special
70. See id. at *1.
71. See id. at *6.
72. See id. at *6–8.
73. See id. at *8.
74. 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427 (Ct. App. 2011).
75. See id. at 429.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 429–30.
78. See id. at 430.
79. See id. at 432 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. See id. at 432.
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relationship ensues when a party takes charge of a third person whom he
or she knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if
not controlled,”81 apparently relying on Sections 316 and 319 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.
A synthesis of the above-referenced cases demonstrates that courts are
willing to find a special relationship between a parent and their adult child
based upon a de facto guardianship where three factors coalesce: (1) the
parents knew, or should have known, their adult child had significant
mental health issues and posed a risk to others; (2) the child resided with
his parents; and (3) the parents acted as if they believed they had the
ability to control the child.82  This proposed test is consistent with Section
316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Knowing that the child has
significant mental health issues addresses Section 316’s parental liability
criterion requiring the parent to know of the need to control the adult
child.  Residing with the adult child is at least prima facie evidence that
the parent had the ability and opportunity to control the child.
II. ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENTS AND
ADULT CHILDREN IN MASS SHOOTING CASES
Having clarified the standard for determining whether a special rela-
tionship exists between parents and an adult child, it is necessary to see if
it is a workable test that does not lead to absurd results.  As demonstrated
by the real-life illustrations that follow, the test is workable.
A. Application of Special Relationship Test to Nancy Lanza
Utilizing the test in Nancy Lanza’s case proves that the special rela-
tionship test above is useful; it yields a finding that a special relationship
existed between Nancy and her son—a result that is not only reasonable,
but instinctively feels correct.
The first requirement of the test, that the parent knows or has reason
to know their child has significant mental health issues and poses a secur-
ity risk, is satisfied.  Nancy knew Adam had a long history of mental health
problems.  At age six, Adam was diagnosed with sensory integration disor-
der, a condition that makes one overly sensitive to stimuli in the environ-
ment and that made him dislike being touched and around many
people.83  By age thirteen, a psychiatrist diagnosed Adam with Asperger’s
81. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. See Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 855–56 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev.
granted in part, cause remanded by 477 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1991); see also Todd v.
Dow, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 490, 493–94 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding there was no special
relationship between parents and their adult son absent any facts showing they had
ability to control him); cf. Thorne v. Ramirez, 346 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (suggesting that, had plaintiff alleged defendant-parents’ child was “de-
pendent, insane or mentally deficient,” plaintiff’s complaint against parents for
child’s intentional tort may have alleged sustainable cause of action).
83. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 334–35.
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Syndrome, a high-functioning form of autism resulting in unusual social
awkwardness.84  While neither one of these conditions have been linked to
violence,85 Adam displayed other disturbing behavior over the years that
would be disconcerting to most parents.  For example, in the fifth grade,
Adam wrote a document entitled the “Big Book of Granny,” wherein the
main character had a gun in her cane and shot people, including chil-
dren.86  In the seventh grade, Adam’s writing assignments contained de-
scriptions of battles and war far more than others his age, and “[t]he level
of violence in the writing was disturbing.”87  Additionally, a month before
the shootings in November of 2012, Adam’s mother confided in a friend
that she was worried about Adam because he had not left the house in
three months, even refusing to go to a hotel with her when Hurricane
Sandy caused a power outage in their home.88
Those who knew Adam described him as a “shut-in who rarely left
home and played military-style video games.”89  Additionally, Adam would
only communicate with his mother through email, even though they re-
sided in the same household.90  Adam also had been estranged from his
father and only brother—one of many indicators he had some mental
health issues.91  Medical doctors found that Adam “lacked empathy and
had very rigid thought processes.”92  For instance, shortly before Adam
killed his mother and the children at Sandy Hook, he told his mother that
he would not care if she had passed away.93  The most compelling evi-
dence that Nancy Lanza knew, or had reason to know, that her son was
mentally ill and dangerous was the fact that she had completed paperwork
to have Adam involuntarily committed to a mental health treatment facil-
84. See id.; see also Flegenheimer & Somaiya, supra note 13.
85. See Adam Clark Estes, Revelations About Adam Lanza’s Mental Health Still
Don’t Explain the Violence, WIRE (Feb. 19, 2013, 11:26 PM), http://www.thewire
.com/national/2013/02/revelations-about-adam-lanzas-mental-health-still-dont-ex-
plain-violence/62317/ [https://perma.cc/G65D-6ZC2].
86. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See id. at 34.
88. See id. at 28; John Christoffersen, New Report Provides the Most Disturbing
Picture Yet of Nancy Lanza’s Relationship with Her Son, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2013,
11:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/paramedic-at-sandy-hook-was-
warned-this-will-be-the-worst-day-of-your-life-2013-12 [https://perma.cc/H3KR-
EC4W].
89. See Susan Candiotti, Greg Botelho & Tom Watkins, Newtown Shooting De-
tails Revealed in Newly Released Documents, CNN (Mar. 29, 2013, 9:53 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/03/28/us/Connecticut-shooting-documents/ [perma
.cc.G26Y-J9XB].
90. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28; Christoffersen, supra note 88.
91. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 3, 29–30 (noting Adam’s brother, who was
four years older, had not had contact with Adam since 2010, despite attempts to
reach him, and Adam’s father had not seen him since 2010, despite the father’s
invitations for Adam to join him for various activities).
92. See id. at 34.
93. See id. at 30.
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ity.94  Since an involuntary civil commitment in Connecticut requires a
finding that a person is mentally ill and poses a danger to themselves or
others,95 one may conclude that Nancy had to believe Adam would harm
himself or someone else.  Indeed, a week before the Sandy Hook tragedy,
Nancy told an acquaintance, “I’m worried I’m losing him,” referencing his
illness.96
The second and third requirements for finding a special relationship
between a parent and their emancipated offspring—that the adult child
resides with his parent and the parent believes he or she has the ability to
control the child—are also satisfied in this case.  Adam lived at home with
his mother at the time of his shooting spree.97  In fact, Adam’s mother
indicated that she did not work because of Adam’s mental condition and
apparently devoted her life to caring for him.98  Like the mother in Silber-
stein, Nancy assumed responsibility for his day-to-day care by washing his
clothes daily, cooking for him, shopping for him, and taking care of him
as if he were a minor child, even though he was an adult.99  Nancy’s care
of her son is distinguishable from a situation where a parent cares for an
adult child out of the goodness of their heart.  Nancy provided for all of
Adam’s needs because he was incapable of caring for himself due to his
mental issues.  For example, she purchased a car for Adam that was regis-
tered in her name only.100  One can infer from the fact that she owned
the car that she could have taken it away from Adam at any time by, for
example, taking his keys away or disabling the vehicle.
Additionally, because Adam did not work, he was wholly dependent
on Nancy for food and his daily needs just like a minor child.101  Adam’s
mother had the ability to and, in fact, did control Adam’s environment.
Persons hired to work on the Lanzas’ home reported that Adam’s mother
never let them in the house, instructed them not to ring the doorbell, and
94. See Winter, supra note 14.
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-502 (West 2015) (permitting psychiatric
commitment under an “emergency certificate” if physician determines person has
“psychiatric disabilities” and poses danger to himself or others).
96. See Matthew Lysiak, Kerry Wills & Stephen Rex Brown, Exclusive: Nancy
Lanza Feared Son, Adam, Was ‘Getting Worse’; Told Friend ‘He Was Burning Himself with
a Lighter’ and That She Was ‘Losing Him,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2012, 9:17 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/nancy-lanza-feared-son-adam-worse-
article-1.1221505 [https://perma.cc/5D5E-5GMC] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
97. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28 (noting that only Nancy and her son had
resided in their family home for extended time prior to shootings on December
14, 2012).
98. See id. at 30.
99. See id. at 30, 35.
100. See id. at 23.
101. See Alaine Griffin & Josh Kovner, New Report on Lanza: Parental Denial,
Breakdowns, Missed Opportunities, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www
.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-newtown-adam-lanza-child-advocate-report-
20141121-story.html [https://perma.cc/WZ9B-PJTS].
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advised them to make prior arrangements for using power equipment be-
cause Adam had problems with loud noises.102  In fact, a number of peo-
ple who knew the mother for years had neither been inside her home nor
met Adam.103
In sum, the overwhelming evidence demonstrates that this was not a
case of a parent simply providing for their child financially; rather, Adam’s
mother had assumed responsibility and charge over Adam.  Accordingly, a
court could easily conclude a relationship between a parent(s) or child
like the Lanzas’ would meet the special relationship test formulated in
Part I(D) for parental liability for adult children.
B. Application of Special Relationship Test to Jared Loughner’s Parents
Likewise, the aforementioned special relationship test could lead a
court to reasonably conclude that Jared Loughner and his parents, Randy
and Amy Loughner, had a “special relationship” for purposes of establish-
ing the first element of negligence—a duty.104  Jared is the twenty-two-
year-old who shot United States Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in the
head and then fired at seventeen others who were waiting to meet Giffords
outside a grocery store in Tucson, Arizona on January 8, 2011.105
Prior to his shooting spree, Jared’s parents knew he had significant
mental health issues and posed a risk of violence to the public.  In the
months leading up to the shootings, Jared was clearly unraveling.  While
attending Pima Community College, he would make inappropriate out-
bursts during class, including remarks about “blowing up babies” and ask-
ing the professor if he believed in mind control.106  He would repeatedly
utter nonsensical statements such as, “How can you deny math instead of
accepting it.”107  Jared also was contacted five times by the police for dis-
ruptive behavior on campus.108 Jared posted a disturbing video on You-
Tube showing him walking around the campus at night with a video
camera threatening to torture students and calling his college a “genocide
102. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 31.
103. See id.
104. See Claire Martin & Masada Siegel, Loughner’s Parents: Did They Know
About His Mental Illness?, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 11, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://www
.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/11/jared-loughners-parents-randy-and-amy-
did-they-know-about-his-mental-illness.html [https://perma.cc/M4J7-44UK] (dis-
cussing Jared’s parents).
105. See Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, Political Reper-
cussions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/us/poli
tics/09giffords.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/AC2W-RYAY] (re-
porting at least seventeen persons were shot and six murdered by twenty-two-year-
old Jared Loughner).  Miraculously, Congresswoman Giffords survived the
shooting.
106. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 332 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. See id.
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school.”109  Pima Community College then notified Jared’s parents of
what he had done and that he was suspended from school, warning that
Jared had mental health issues and may be dangerous and that Jared
could not return to school until he had a mental health clearance.110
Randy and Amy Loughner also personally observed their son talking
to himself and displaying other strange behavior like refusing to commu-
nicate with them and making worrisome noises.111  Randy found some of
Jared’s journals that were written in script that was “indecipherable.”112
Jared’s parents indicated by their actions that they believed Jared was dan-
gerous; for example, they confiscated the only gun they believed he had
and disabled his car every night to keep him home.113  Additionally, both
of Jared’s parents pleaded with him to get help, but Jared refused, and his
parents never had Jared psychologically evaluated.114  In light of these
facts, it is clear that the Loughners knew their son had significant mental
health issues and was potentially dangerous; thus, the first criterion of the
special relationship test is met.  The second requirement that the adult
child live with his parents is clearly satisfied because Jared resided with his
parents.115
The third criterion—that the parents believed they had the ability to
control Jared—is a closer call.  On one hand, Amy and Randy acted as if
they believed they had the ability to control their son by routinely disa-
bling his car and taking away his shotgun after he started acting errati-
cally.116  The night before Jared’s shooting spree, however, his father
109. See id.; Michael Martinez & Chelsea J. Carter, New Details: Loughner’s Par-
ents Took Gun, Disabled Car to Keep Him Home, CNN (Mar. 28, 2013, 11:45 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/27/justice/arizona-loughner-details/ [https://per
ma.cc/3JM9-HCJN]; Tim Steller, What Loughner’s Parents Knew: They Watched His
Decline but Didn’t Arrange for Treatment, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 28, 2013, 12:00 AM,
http://tucson.com/news/local/crime/what-loughner-s-parents-knew-they-
watched-his-decline-but/article_fb334f4e-4d20-5d80-baac-b467e8f56cb9.html
[https://perma.cc/3GDV-CMQS] (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See Franke-Ruta, supra note 8; Courtney Hutchison & ABC News Med.
Unit, Violence and Mental Illness: Is Loughner a Case for Involuntary Commitment?, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/MindMoodNews/jared-
loughner-involuntarily-committed/story?id=12593355 [https://perma.cc/5FW9-
NHK6]; Martinez & Carter, supra note 109; Dennis Wagner, Records Detail Shooter’s
Agitation Before Ariz. Rampage, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:47 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/27/gabby-giffords-shooting-records/
2024589/ [https://perma.cc/XBK7-WWPR].
111. See Wagner, supra note 110.
112. See Jared Lee Loughner Grew Delusional in Months Before Tucson Rampage,
Police Reports Show, CBSNEWS (Mar. 27, 2013, 6:29 PM) [hereinafter Loughner CBS
Article], http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jared-lee-loughner-grew-delusional-in-
months-before-tucson-rampage-police-reports-show/ [https://perma.cc/L9GF-
AA65].
113. See Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
114. See id.; Hutchison & ABC News Med. Unit, supra note 110; Wagner, supra
note 110.
115. See Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
116. See id.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss1/1
2016] THE COST OF RAISING A KILLER 17
forgot to disable the car.117  Additionally, on the day of the shooting, Ja-
red tried to leave the house with a black bag, and when his parents asked
what was in the bag, Jared bolted out the door.118  Jared’s father chased
him down the street on foot but, unfortunately, could not catch him.119
The father then jumped in his car to follow Jared and Jared ran off into
the desert.120  Apparently, the bag contained a gun Jared had legally pur-
chased on November 30, 2010, unbeknown to his parents.121  Jared then
caught a cab to the grocery store where he shot Congresswoman Giffords
and seventeen others.122
While some could argue that Jared’s parents’ inability to stop him
from leaving the house on the day of the murders shows that they did not
have the ability to control him, the test requires only that the parents be-
lieve they have the ability to control their adult offspring; it does not re-
quire the ability to control in actuality.  On the other hand, Jared’s parents
stated that during this time period they could not have a rational conversa-
tion with Jared, who had stopped speaking with them.  They also reported
to investigators “they had lost control of their son long before the shoot-
ings.”123  At times, Jared would leave the Loughners’ home and check-in
at a hotel, and they would go looking for him and bring him home.  Thus,
a court could come out either way on whether a special relationship ex-
isted in this case.
C. Applying Special Relationship Test to Elliot Rodgers’s Parents
In contrast to the Lanza and Loughner cases, the special relationship
test articulated in Part I(D) of this Article would lead a court to conclude
that no special relationship existed between Elliot Rodgers and his par-
ents.  Elliot is the twenty-two-year-old community college student who, in
May of 2014, stabbed his three roommates to death and then randomly
shot and killed three other college students from his BMW in Santa Bar-
bara, California.124  A month before Elliot’s heinous acts, his mother saw
117. David Trifunov, Jared Loughner Evidence Reveals Parents Hid Guns Before
Tucson Shooting (VIDEO), GLOBAL POST (Mar. 27, 2013, 6:01 PM), http://www
.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/united-states/130327/jared-
loughner-evidence-gabby-giffords-tucson-shooting [https://perma.cc/5WKS-
9L3P].
118. See Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
119. See Wagner, supra note 110.
120. See id.
121. See Steller, supra note 109.
122. See id.; see also Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
123. See Wagner, supra note 110.
124. See Elliot Rodger’s Family Tried to Intervene Before Deadly Rampage, FOX NEWS
(May 27, 2014) [hereinafter Fox News Elliot Rodger’s Article], http://www.fox
news.com/us/2014/05/27/elliot-rodgers-family-tried-to-intervene-before-deadly-
rampage/ [https://perma.cc/9P7M-YRCV]; Christopher Weber & Alicia Chang,
Elliot Rodger’s Family Tried to Intervene Before Rampage, HUFFINGTON POST (May 26,
2014, 8:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/26/elliot-rodgers-fami
ly_n_5392211.html [https://perma.cc/AVS8-8QMZ] (updated July 26, 2014).
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some disturbing videos he had posted on YouTube and alerted one of her
son’s mental health counselors.125  The mental health counselor notified
the police, who went to Elliot’s doorstep to check on him, but ultimately
took no action because Elliot presented himself as a well-mannered young
man who posed no risk for violence.126  As Elliot divulged in his 140-page
manifesto, which was found after the killings, if the police searched his
room, they would have uncovered a cache of firearms and his murderous
plot.127  In fact, hours before Elliot committed his shooting spree, he
emailed his manifesto about committing a deadly rampage “to a couple of
dozen people, including his parents” and one of his therapists.128  Upon
receiving this manifesto, Elliot’s mother promptly called the authorities
and raced to Santa Barbara with her husband to stop Elliot but, unfortu-
nately, arrived too late.129
While under these facts, Elliot’s parents knew he had significant
mental health issues and had reason to believe he may harm someone due
to his Internet postings, the second and third criterion of the special rela-
tionship test are not met.  Elliot did not live with his parents, and there
was no evidence that they acted in a manner that would cause one to be-
lieve they had the ability to control him.  In fact, the evidence points to the
contrary: when they learned of his inflammatory internet postings, they
did not try and handle the matter alone but contacted the authorities.
Moreover, they did not assume responsibility for Elliot’s day-to-day care, as
he was taking care of himself and living independently in his own apart-
ment hours away.130  Therefore, no special relationship was established,
and thus no duty to warn or protect others arose in this case nor could
arise in others like it.
In sum, the special relationship test formulated in the Part I(D) is
workable.  Its application will only yield findings of a special relationship
between a parent and their adult child when the parent has assumed de
facto guardianship of their adult offspring by taking full responsibility for
that child, allowing the child to reside with them, and trying to control
their behavior.  Establishing a special relationship, however, does not end
the duty inquiry.  It is only a prerequisite for finding a special relationship-
based duty.  Should a court recognize a special relationship in the context
of a mass shooting case, the next inquiry is whether the majority of policy
125. See Fox News Elliot Rodger’s Article, supra note 124.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Daily Mail Reporters, Virgin Killer’s Parents Read His Hate-Filled Mani-
festo Then Called the Police and Rushed to Stop Him When They Heard of Murder Spree on
Their Car Radio, DAILYMAIL.COM (May 25, 2014, 7:44 PM), http://www.dailymail.co
.uk/news/article-2639177/Parents-shooter-read-manifesto-driving-stop-son-heard-
massacre-radio-revealed-investigators-search-moms-house.html [https://perma.cc/
3PRK-BXFH] (updated May 2, 2014, 10:47 PM).
129. See id.
130. See id.
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considerations weigh in favor of recognizing a duty, which is addressed in
Part III.
III. OVERVIEW OF PARENTAL NEGLIGENCE AND ESTABLISHING
A DUTY TO PROTECT OR WARN
A. The Negligence Cause of Action and Its Pitfalls
To establish parental negligence, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
parents owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the parents breached that duty;
and (3) the parents’ breach caused the plaintiff’s injury.131  While this
formula seems rather straightforward to apply, it is fraught with difficul-
ties, particularly the first and third elements.132
The first element of parental negligence—duty—can be problematic;
it is essentially a policy and moral question concerning how far parental
liability should reasonably extend, which varies from court to court and is
constantly evolving over time, hampering the ability to predict, with any
certainty, how a court will resolve a future similar case.133  This fluctua-
tion, however, is not necessarily a negative when it comes to negligence in
the context of mass murder, which is a relatively new phenomenon.  Addi-
tionally, the duty analysis in the third-party criminal act context is compli-
cated because it is partially dependent upon whether the third party’s
criminal act was foreseeable, and in the majority of mass shooting cases,
the perpetrators had no prior history of shooting violence, making their
sudden criminal attack arguably capricious.134  Further adding to the con-
131. See Lisa Lockwood, Comment, Where Are the Parents? Parental Criminal Re-
sponsibility for the Acts of Children, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497, 512 (2000).
132. See Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent
Storage of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1226 (2000) (“Virtually all cases involving
negligence liability for criminal attacks, including those involving negligent fire-
arm storage, purport to turn on the elements of ‘duty’ and ‘proximate cause’
along with their damnable, murky companion, ‘foreseeability.’  Duty and proxi-
mate cause have long been sources of confusion for law students and lawyers alike,
who search in vein for concrete rules on which to base such determinations.” (foot-
note omitted)).
133. See Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440, 441 (Ct. App.
1987) (explaining judicial treatment of duty—which “is not sacrosanct or an im-
mutable fact of nature, but only a shorthand expression of the sum total of public
policy considerations which lead the law to protect a particular plaintiff from
harm”—has “left a legacy of analytical confusion”); Craig v. A.A.R. Realty Corp.,
576 A.2d 688, 692 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (explaining that duty is “frequently an
expression by the court of evolving public policy”); see also Porter, supra note 17, at
567 (observing that “[o]ver the past few decades, duty has evolved into a more
individualized, less predictable inquiry”).
134. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Justice of Parental Accountability: Hypo-
thetical Disinterested Citizens and Real Victims’ Voices in the Debate over Expanded Parental
Liability, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 389 (2002); see also W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Fore-
seeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 740–41 (2005) (noting foreseeability determination
in negligence is problematic for two reasons: (1) it leads to inconsistency in judi-
cial outcomes and (2) it usurps the role of the jury in deciding whether the defen-
dant’s conduct was reasonable).
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volution of the duty analysis in the case of a mass shooting is the fact that
the law has been reluctant to hold parents responsible for the violent acts
of their minor children.135  If the law is hesitant to hold parents liable for
the violent criminal acts of their minor children, will courts be even more
reticent to hold parents responsible for the violent acts of their legally
emancipated offspring, who are often the offenders in mass shootings?
The third element of negligence—causation—has also been a source
of puzzlement.  Tort experts have long opined “[t]here is perhaps nothing
in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or
upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.”136  Part of the
confusion stems from the fact that a foreseeability determination must also
be made at this stage of the negligence analysis, and some courts use duty-
foreseeability cases to make causation-foreseeability determinations.137
The foreseeability consideration for causation is different from the one
used to determine whether the law should recognize a duty, however.  As
one scholar has noted, “[w]hile duty employs a forward-looking foresee-
ability analysis, proximate cause employs a backward-looking foreseeability
analysis.”138  In other words, when considering foreseeability in the duty
analysis, the question is whether it was generally foreseeable that the
harm—or, in the third-party criminal act context, the third party’s crimi-
nal act—would occur.  This requires foresight.  When considering foresee-
ability for the purposes of determining proximate cause, however, the
relevant inquiry is whether, looking back in hindsight at what actually oc-
curred, was it foreseeable that the precise harm that occurred would hap-
pen, i.e., was the injury or mass shooting a natural and probable
consequence of the defendant’s breach of duty?139  Thus, foreseeability in
the causation-element analysis is more specific, whereas the foresight de-
termination in the duty analysis is more general.140  The concept of fore-
seeability also appears in the analysis for the second element, breach of
135. See Porter, supra note 17, at 535 (observing “common law courts have
resisted exposing parents to civil liability” and “it remains the rare case that sur-
vives summary judgment or a motion to strike”).
136. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236
(4th ed. 1971).
137. See Deborah J. La Fetra, A Moving Target: Property Owners’ Duty to Prevent
Criminal Acts on the Premises, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 410 (2006) (noting courts
“frequently use duty-foreseeability cases as precedent to support causation-foresee-
ability holdings and vice versa”).
138. Rory Bahadur, Almost a Century and Three Restatements After Green It’s Time
to Admit and Remedy the Nonsense of Negligence, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 61, 86 (2011).
139. See id. at 87; see also McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 344 P.3d 661, 665
(Wash. 2015) (en banc) (explaining foreseeability of harm determination in causa-
tion element analysis limits scope of defendant’s duty and asks “whether the harm
sustained is reasonably perceived as being within the general field of danger cov-
ered by the duty owed by the defendant”).
140. See Bahadur, supra note 138, at 87.
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duty, and this overlap also adds to the perplexity of the negligence
analysis.141
Notwithstanding the complexities of the negligence analysis, the rest
of this Article will demonstrate that by employing general negligence prin-
ciples, there are some instances where a plaintiff should be able to prove
that a parent’s conduct or failure to act is clearly unreasonable and negli-
gent under common law negligence principles in mass shooting cases.
There will be other cases where the parents’ conduct or failure to act was
certainly reasonable and no liability should attach.  Finally, some parental
conduct or omissions will fall squarely in the middle of the spectrum and
should be left for a jury to decide.
B. Proving a Duty Should Be Recognized in Mass Murder Cases
It is axiomatic that
[r]egardless of how morally, ethically or socially deplorable a de-
fendant’s conduct may be viewed by other constituencies, in the
eyes of the law, the defendant may not be held to answer in negli-
gence unless and until the court determines, as a matter of law,
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.142
A “duty” is an “obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks.”143  Thus, the first issue that must be addressed
is whether the parent of an emancipated, mentally ill child has a duty to
prevent that adult child from committing a mass shooting.  More specifi-
cally, does the parent have a duty to supervise or control that child’s be-
havior so that they do not have access to firearms, and if they cannot
control the child, do they have a duty to warn the proper authorities (the
police, the court, or mental health professionals) so they can attempt to
contain the child or prevent them from harming the public?
Whether a duty exists is a threshold question of law that is decided by
the court.144  In fact, many negligence cases fail because of the court’s
141. Accord id. at 62–64 (describing confusion over foreseeability determina-
tion that is part of test for three negligence elements—duty, breach, and proxi-
mate cause—and various ways courts have tried to distinguish the determinations
by using differentiating terms like specific foreseeability vs. general foreseeability and for-
ward-looking foreseeability vs. backward-looking foreseeability); Cardi, supra note 134, at
743 (noting that courts rely upon some form of foreseeability determination in
ascertaining whether duty, breach, and proximate cause elements of negligence
are satisfied).
142. Doe 30’s Mother v. Bradley, 58 A.3d 429, 436 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012).
143. Bridges v. Parrish, 731 S.E.2d 262, 265 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting
Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 465 S.E.2d 2, 6 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 742 S.E.2d 794 (N.C. 2013).
144. See Shelley Ross Saxer, “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”: Requiring Landowner
Disclosure of the Presence of Sex Offenders and Other Criminal Activity, 80 NEB. L. REV.
522, 526 (2001) (footnote in title omitted).
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finding that there was no duty to act, either because there was no special
relationship or the third party’s criminal conduct was unforeseeable.145
As previously explained, a court can find a special relationship between an
adult mass shooter and his parents if the criteria specified in Part I(D) are
met.
“Courts will generally find a duty where reasonable persons would rec-
ognize and agree that it exists,”146 and it is well established that “[e]very
one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that
may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.”147  But remember, paren-
tal liability is generally not premised on negligent acts affirmatively com-
mitted by the parents themselves, but rather on their failure to prevent
malevolent acts by their children.  Thus, how the duty issue is analyzed
depends upon whether the plaintiff is alleging misfeasance or
nonfeasance.148
1. Nonfeasance vs. Misfeasance
Nonfeasance refers to when a defendant fails to act for the protection
of others,149 whereas misfeasance is “active misconduct working positive
injury to others.”150  Classic examples of nonfeasance in the third-party,
criminal attacker context are the defendant’s failure to (1) control the
criminal attacker; (2) warn identifiable potential victims or the proper au-
thorities of the assailant’s dangerousness; or (3) take measures to protect
the victims from the third-party attacker.151  An example of misfeasance
that could arise in the context of a mass shooting would be that the parent
acted negligently by entrusting a dangerous instrumentality to a known
mentally ill person.152
145. See Bahadur, supra note 138, at 69–70 (observing that judges play impor-
tant role in negligence cases “as gatekeepers or screeners of negligence actions”
because “[i]f the court determines that no duty of care is owed to the plaintiff or
that no duty of care exists, then the court may dismiss the action as a matter of
law”).
146. Estate of Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 2003).
147. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting).
148. See Smith v. Freund, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2011).
149. See Price v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 167 (Del.
2011).
150. Cara McDonald, Case Note, Torts Law: Blurred Elements: The Nebulous Na-
ture of Foreseeability, the Confounding Quality of Misfeasance, and the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s Decisions—Doe 169 v. Brandon, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 365, 369 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See Eric J. v. Betty M., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 551, 558 (Ct. App. 1999)
(recognizing failure to warn and failure to protect as nonfeasance claims).
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B cmt. e, illus. 11 (1965) (list-
ing negligent entrustment of firearms to minors as one situation where defendant
can be responsible for third party’s criminal act because his affirmative act—mis-
feasance—created the risk of harm).
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Obviously, claims of misfeasance are easier to prove and will fare far
better than nonfeasance allegations, because misfeasance actually involves
wrongdoing on the parents’ parts.153  For example, in the case of Nancy
Lanza, it would be easier to make a case that she negligently stored her
firearms or entrusted them to her son, whom she knew was severely men-
tally ill, than to establish that she was negligent for failing to supervise or
control him.154  This is especially true because in negligent entrustment
and other misfeasance cases, the plaintiff does not have to establish a spe-
cial relationship between the parent and third-party criminal actor, since
the gravamen of a misfeasance complaint is not based upon the third
party’s criminal act, but rather the parent’s own affirmative act that cre-
ated an unreasonable risk of harm.155  Indeed, it could be argued that
giving a mentally ill person a firearm is negligence per se in light of fed-
eral and state laws prohibiting the transfer of firearms to mentally unstable
persons.156  Accordingly, where possible, a plaintiff should frame the par-
ents’ duty as a question of misfeasance to increase their odds of success.
153. See John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Obser-
vations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others,
1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 872–73 (noting if defendant’s behavior is characterized as
nonfeasance, in most cases courts will find no duty); Brian D. Bender, Case Note,
Torts: The Failings of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction and the Special Relationship
Requirement in the Criminal Acts of Third Persons—State v. Back, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 390, 391–92 (2010) (acknowledging that “[i]f the defendant’s act is character-
ized as misfeasance, a duty generally attaches to prevent the harm caused by those
actions[,]” but “[i]f the defendant’s act is characterized as nonfeasance, there is
typically no duty to prevent the harm caused by the third person absent some
special relationship”).
154. Courts have no problem finding that homeowners have a duty to not
entrust an inherently dangerous instrumentality like a gun to a mentally disturbed
individual or to safely store such a dangerous instrumentality in a home where a
mentally ill individual has access. See e.g., Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 832–33
(Mass. 2006) (holding that “a homeowner who permits guns to be stored on her
property and allows unsupervised access to that property by a person known by her
to have a history of violence and mental instability, has a duty of reasonable care to
ensure that the guns are properly secured,” and that it was foreseeable that her
live-in boyfriend’s mentally ill son could take one of the guns and shoot someone,
including a police officer).  “[N]early every state has [recognized] some form of
the negligent entrustment doctrine.” See Andrew D. Holder, Comment, Negligent
Entrustment: The Wrong Solution to the Serious Problem of Illegal Gun Sales in Kansas
[Shirley v. Glass, 241 P.3d 134 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010)], 50 WASHBURN L.J. 743, 747
(2011).
155. See Bender, supra note 153, at 396 (stating “courts will generally hold a
person accountable for their misfeasance . . . . [because] [t]his accountability gen-
erally does not depend on whether that harm arises from an act—criminal or oth-
erwise—of a third person[,]” and that Minnesota requires plaintiff to show special
relationship only in nonfeasance cases); see also Price v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 26 A.3d 162, 170 (Del. 2011) (recognizing that “[i]n cases of nonfeasance, no
duty of care exists between the parties unless a ‘special relationship’ between them
gives rise to one”).
156. See, e.g., Martin v. Schroeder, 105 P.3d 577, 583 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)
(recognizing that parents violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) by buying a gun for their
adult, eighteen-year-old son whom they knew was a drug abuser and thus commit-
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Additionally, it should be noted that whether a policy consideration
weighs in favor of recognizing a duty depends on the particular duty the
plaintiff alleges the defendant owed to them and the specific facts of the
case.  For instance, the duty-policy analysis in a case alleging that parents
were negligent for failing to have their child involuntarily committed to a
mental institution will be quite different than one alleging the parent was
negligent for failing to properly supervise their offspring to prevent him
from accessing a gun, the former being much more difficult to prove be-
cause of the competing policy considerations concerned—the need to
protect the public versus the mentally ill individual’s freedom.  Thus, it
would be better to cast the duty in, broader terms—such as the duty
to supervise or control the third-party attacker—than a more specific
allegation—such as the defendant parents had a duty to have their emancipated
offspring involuntarily committed.
Although nonfeasance duties are harder to prove than misfeasance
duties, it does not follow that plaintiffs cannot successfully establish non-
feasance negligence cases against parents.  Because most parental liability
cases involving mass shooters will probably also involve negligence allega-
tions based upon nonfeasance, this Section will primarily focus on the
nonfeasance duties of parents’ failure to control, protect, or warn.
2. Duty-Policy Considerations
As previously explained, in order for courts to find a special relation-
ship-based duty to prevent a mass shooting under a nonfeasance theory, a
plaintiff has to prove more than the existence of a special relationship
between the parents and their emancipated offspring; they must also es-
tablish that a myriad of policy considerations weigh in favor of recognizing
a duty.157  The policy concerns that have been considered include (1) the
reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame at-
ted negligence per se); West v. MacHe of Cochran, Inc., 370 S.E.2d 169, 173 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding licensed firearms dealer committed negligence per se by
knowingly selling firearm to mentally ill individual, in violation of federal and state
law); Rubin v. Johnson, 550 N.E.2d 324, 330–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
there was sufficient evidence that pawn shop owner violated state statute prohibit-
ing sale or transfer of a firearm to person of “unsound mind” and thus committed
negligence per se).  To establish negligence per se, you have to show (1) a viola-
tion of a statute; (2) the statute was intended to protect the class of people to
which the plaintiff belongs; and (3) the statute was design to prevent the type of
harm that occurred. See Rubin, 550 N.E.2d at 329.  It should be noted that a find-
ing of negligence per se is not necessarily a finding of liability per se; the plaintiff
must still prove that the defendant’s negligence caused the harm. See Williams ex
rel. Raymond v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 99 So. 3d 112, 116–17 (Miss. 2012).
157. See Smith v. Freund, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 2011). But see
Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 670 (Mont. 1996) (dispensing with special-
relationship inquiry in duty analysis and only considering foreseeability of risk of
harm and weighing policy considerations to determine existence of duty).
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tached to the defendant’s conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future
harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant to prevent the harm;
(7) the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach; and (8) the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.158  All of these policy factors
will be addressed below.  Because foreseeability is the most important pol-
icy consideration in the duty analysis in the majority of jurisdictions,159 it
will be addressed first, separate from the other policy concerns.
a. Foreseeability of Mass Murders
It is well settled that for an act to be foreseeable for purposes of the
duty analysis, the third party’s criminal conduct must be reasonably antici-
pated,160 thereby excluding remote and unexpected events from the
realm of foreseeability.161  Courts disagree, however, over what test should
be applied to determine whether the defendant should have foreseen the
third party’s conduct.
Some jurisdictions have found that the third party had to have com-
mitted a “similar” prior criminal act for the defendant to foresee a crimi-
nal act could occur again, but nevertheless treat similar prior criminal acts
as if they must be identical.162  In these jurisdictions, it will be impossible
158. These policy concerns were originally enunciated by the California Su-
preme Court in Rowland v. Christian, and many courts have subsequently adopted
some or all of the Rowland policy concerns in its duty analysis. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1057 (Ill. 2006); Rodriguez v. Spencer, 902
S.W.2d 37, 43 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); see also Tory A. Weigand, Duty, Causation and
Palsgraf: Massachusetts and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 96 MASS. L. REV. 55, 57–58
(2015) (reporting recent survey that revealed most states (1) utilize multi-policy
test to make duty determinations and (2) include foreseeability in that multi-factor
policy duty assessment).
159. See Weigand, supra note 158, at 58 (observing most jurisdictions include
foreseeability in their duty analysis and leave duty-foreseeability determination for
jury to decide); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1260 (2009) (noting foreseeability plays sig-
nificant role in duty analysis in forty-seven states); see also Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (observing “most important” policy
consideration in establishing whether duty exists is foreseeability); Margaret W. v.
Kelley R., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519, 530 (Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that in determin-
ing defendant’s liability in third-party criminal conduct cases, foreseeability is cru-
cial factor); Romero v. Giant Stop-n-Go, Inc., 212 P.3d 408, 410 (N.M. Ct. App.
2009) (reiterating “[f]oreseeability is a critical and essential component of New
Mexico’s duty analysis because no one is bound to guard against or take measures
to avert that which he or she would not reasonably anticipate as likely to happen”
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160. Steve Jasper, Note, Congratulations! It’s a Tort: Expanding the Scope of Duty
in the Surrogacy Setting, 67 MO. L. REV. 421, 429 (2002); Jeffrey H. Powell, Com-
ment, Marshall v. Burger King Corp.: Making a Mess of  “Duty” for Businesses in Illi-
nois, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 95, 112 (2007).
161. See Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 444 (Ct. App. 1987).
162. See Trammell Crow Cent. Tex. Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 11, 12, 17
(Tex. 2008) (stating that foreseeability of criminal acts of third party on one’s
property is established by evidence of “specific previous crimes on or near the
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to establish that an adult child’s mass shooting was foreseeable because, as
previously mentioned, the typical mass shooter has no prior criminal his-
tory, and in the event they had committed a mass murder before, they may
have already been incarcerated, serving a life sentence, or sitting on death
row, consequently unable to commit the mass shooting at issue.
Other states have concluded that for an act to be foreseeable, it has to
be of the same general character of the past event or harm, and they apply
a totality of the circumstances test—which includes considerations such as
the proximity of, frequency of, and publicity surrounding prior similar in-
cidents—to determine whether the act is of the same general character.163
In these jurisdictions, it will also be virtually impossible to show a mass
shooting is foreseeable because rarely, if ever, does a mass shooting occur
at the same locale.  And while the occurrence of mass shootings overall
nationwide may have increased, the frequency of mass shootings in partic-
ular areas has not.
A few jurisdictions, like California and Tennessee, treat foreseeability
as a flexible, fluid concept and employ a balancing test that weighs the
foreseeability and gravity of the harm against the burden of preventing the
harm.164  In these jurisdictions, if the burden of preventing the harm is
great—such as hiring security guards to prevent criminal activity on a
property—a heightened degree of foreseeability is required.165  Con-
versely, if the burden of preventing harm is minimal—such as placing a
telephone call to 911 during an ongoing criminal attack—then a lesser
degree of foreseeability is required because, for example, it does not take
much foresight for a defendant who is witnessing a fistfight to know some-
one will be seriously injured when the defendant also knows one of the
participants has a knife.166
Depending upon the duty alleged and the facts of the case, applying
this more flexible foreseeability test will make it easier to determine
premises” and holding prior robberies at a shopping center were insufficient to
make shooting and killing of apparent robbery victim foreseeable when no one
was seriously injured in previous robberies and no weapon was used on person
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Craig Crawford, Comment, Delgado
v. Trax Bar & Grill: Determining the Scope of the Prior Similar Incidents Test in Terms of
Efficient Resource Allocation, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 499, 503 (2005) (noting that in prem-
ises liability cases, “[s]ome jurisdictions interpreted the prior similar incidents test
to require prior ‘identical’ incidents. . . . [and] imposed a duty on a landowner
only where there was evidence of a prior incident of the same crime occurring in
approximately the same manner”).
163. See Glenda K. Harnad, Effect of Foreseeability, 53 TEX. JUR. 3D NEGLIGENCE
§ 59 (3d ed. & Supp. 2015); Saxer, supra note 144, at 527–30 (acknowledging fore-
seeability may be based upon prior similar conduct or totality of circumstances).
164. See Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 113 P.3d 1159, 1166–70 (Cal. 2005);
Lopez, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (noting “[f]oreseeability is . . . an elastic factor within a
somewhat flexible concept”); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d
891, 901–02 (Tenn. 1996).
165. See Delgado, 113 P.3d at 1166–69.
166. See Morris v. De la Torre, 113 P.3d 1182, 1184, 1189 (Cal. 2005).
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whether a mass shooting was foreseeable.  For instance, if it is alleged that
the defendant had a duty to supervise the adult child to prevent a mass
shooting, the degree of foreseeability will be high and more difficult to
meet.  If the alleged duty is a duty to call the police when a known-to-be
mentally ill child runs out the door with a gun or plans a mass murder, the
degree of foreseeability required is low because the burden on the parents
is minimal.  Thus, the foreseeability requirement will be easier to satisfy in
the latter case and others like it.
The foreseeability test will be easiest to satisfy in jurisdictions that also
require lesser foreseeability when there are strong policy reasons for
preventing the harm.167  For example, in Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America,
Inc.,168 a California appellate court found that it was foreseeable that a
child would fall victim to a sexual predator who was serving as an adult
scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts, irrespective of the fact that the troop leader
had no prior documented instances of sexual molestation.169  In reaching
this conclusion, the court emphasized that based upon legal commentary,
reported cases, and books, the Boy Scouts organization had to have known
the possibility existed that pedophiles would be attracted to the Boy Scouts
organization because working there would give them legitimate access to
young children.170
Additionally, the court pointed to a much earlier California case that
found sexual assault by unknown third parties against young children was
foreseeable because “[i]t is certain that there exists in our civilization the
constant possibility that persons suffering from a lack of proper mental
balance or normal decency might subject young people to sexual molesta-
tion.”171  In that earlier case, the court stressed that the constant threat of
sexual abuse against children abounded, as illustrated by frequent newspa-
per accounts of sexual crimes against children, the many litigated criminal
cases on the issue, and the legislative enactment of laws to protect chil-
dren.172  Most significantly, the court emphasized that “[i]f injury to another
. . . is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful
[person] would take account of it in guiding practical conduct[,] . . .  we must label
the injury reasonably foreseeable . . . .”173  The court further explained that a
showing of foreseeability—not the more stringent standard of
probability—is what is required to satisfy this aspect of the special relation-
ship-based duty test.174  Accordingly, the court found that the sexual as-
167. See id.
168. 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12 (Ct. App. 2000).
169. See id. at 31.
170. See id. at 30.
171. Id. at 31 (quoting Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896 (Ct.
App. 1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See Wallace, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
173. Juarez, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30 (second alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. See id. at 31.
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sault was foreseeable, and the Boy Scouts had a duty to take reasonable
measures to protect the victim, such as by training the boy scouts on how
to handle a sexual predator.175
Applying Juarez to the foreseeability of mass shootings in general, and
Adam Lanza’s and Jared Loughner’s mass shootings in particular, an argu-
ment can easily be made that mass shootings are foreseeable when certain
factors exist.  First, similar to the sexual assaults in Juarez, the possibility of
a random mass shooting committed by a mentally unbalanced person who
exhibits certain signs has been so well-publicized in literature and the me-
dia that it should be reasonably anticipated if someone is acting in the
manner described in the next two sentences, they are a candidate for com-
mitting a mass murder.  For instance, the media has consistently reported
that most mass shooters have no prior criminal history of violence, which
makes the lack of a criminal record itself a common characteristic of a
mass shooter.176  Other common characteristics include a person (1) dis-
playing mentally unbalanced behavior to the extent that it causes others
around them to be concerned; (2) being anti-social, reclusive, or angry
with the world; (3) having an unusual obsession with prior public mass
shootings or firearms; and (4) manifesting an intent to kill either in writ-
ings, YouTube postings, other social media, or telling a friend or acquain-
tance of their murderous plot.177
Both Adam Lanza and Jared Loughner displayed most, if not all, of
these signs, and thus their parents should have known they were severely
mentally ill, potentially dangerous, and capable of shooting someone.  As
to Adam Lanza, he displayed clear signs of mental illness and was the epit-
ome of a recluse.  He had stopped verbally communicating with his
mother except through email and refused to leave their home for any
reason in the three months leading up to the shootings, even when their
electricity went out due to Hurricane Sandy.178  These actions, coupled
with his lifetime history of mental health issues, should have put his
mother on notice that he was not in a healthy mental state and had no
business handling a firearm.  Adam also had an unusual obsession with
mass shootings and guns.  After Adam’s killing spree, police found an
enormous amount of material on mass shootings and firearms, including a
spreadsheet on mass murders listing details about each shooting.179  Thus,
it was foreseeable that Adam could harm anyone in the general public
with a firearm.180
175. See id.
176. See Weber & Chang, supra note 124 (observing commonalities between
recent mass shooters James Holmes, Adam Lanza, and Elliott Rodger—“[a]ll were
young loners with no criminal history”).
177. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 338–39.
178. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28.
179. See id. at 25–26.
180. See Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 856 (Minn. Ct. App.) (“Signifi-
cantly, the duty to control, unlike the duty to warn, may arise if there is foreseeable
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Regarding Jared Loughner, there is substantial evidence that his par-
ents also should have reasonably anticipated that he would shoot and kill
someone, given his mental instability and potential for violence.  Evidence
of his mental instability included talking to himself while at the same time
refusing to communicate with his parents, making nonsensical rants, and
writing incoherent statements in his journal.181  Additionally, Jared’s par-
ents knew he had been suspended from school for exhibiting mentally
unstable behavior, including making an outburst in class about “blowing
up babies” and posting a YouTube video showing him prowling around his
campus at night with a video camera threatening to torture students.182
Jared’s college further advised his parents that they believed Jared posed a
danger to himself and others and could not return to campus until a
mental health professional had determined he was no longer danger-
ous.183  Accordingly, it was certainly foreseeable that someone with this
mental state could harm someone if they were armed.
Indeed, not only were Adam Lanza’s and Jared Lougnher’s mass
shootings foreseeable, but their parents’ actions demonstrate that they ac-
tually foresaw their sons seriously injuring or murdering someone.  As pre-
viously mentioned, Adam Lanza’s mother had planned to have him
involuntarily committed to a mental health facility shortly before his
shooting spree,184 which indicates she believed he was capable of commit-
ting violence because in order to have someone involuntarily committed,
you have to believe the person is mentally ill and dangerous.185  Jared
Loughner’s parents obviously believed he was capable of harming the pub-
lic, as they confiscated the only firearm they believed he owned and dis-
abled his vehicle every night to keep him home.186  Also, on the morning
of Loughner’s shooting rampage, his father tried to see what was in the
bag he was carrying, rightfully believing it was a gun, and even chased
Jared in an apparent effort to seize him and his belongings, though he was
ultimately unsuccessful.187
It could be argued, based upon Lopez v. McDonald’s, that mass shoot-
ings of random people in general are a remote and unexpected event and
thus are unforeseeable.  In Lopez, a California court found that a mass
harm to a member of the general public.”), rev. granted in part, cause remanded by
477 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1991).
181. See Wagner, supra note 110.
182. See Shaundra K. Lewis, Bullets and Books by Legislative Fiat: Why Academic
Freedom and Public Policy Permit Higher Education Institutions to Say No to Guns, 48
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
183. James B. Jacobs & Jennifer Jones, Keeping Firearms Out of the Hands of the
Dangerously Mentally Ill, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 388, 388 (2011).
184. See Winter, supra note 14, and accompanying text.
185. See John Glenn et al., Persons Subject to Commitment or Confinement, 56 C.J.S
MENTAL HEALTH § 54 (2015) (“A person may not be involuntarily committed to an
institution for the mentally ill unless the person is mentally ill and dangerous.”).
186. See Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
187. See Wagner, supra note 110.
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murderous assault on McDonald’s patrons and employees that left twenty-
one persons dead and eleven others wounded was unforeseeable.188
There, survivors and deceased victims’ family members sued McDonald’s
for negligence, claiming the company had a duty to protect its patrons
from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties—namely, a men-
tally disturbed gunman—and that it had breached that duty by not having
security personnel to protect the patrons.189  The plaintiffs presented evi-
dence the shooting was foreseeable, because that particular McDonald’s
was in a high-crime area, and there had been some thefts, robberies, and
assaults with a deadly weapon in the vicinity.190  The appellate court found
that the prior criminal activity at McDonald’s and the immediate sur-
rounding area were predominately theft-related offenses and not the type
of shooting massacre that occurred in the instant case.  The court further
reasoned that a shooting rampage was so remote and unexpected that, as
a matter of law, McDonald’s nonfeasance in not providing security guards
did not facilitate the shooting’s occurrence.191  Further, the court con-
cluded that a mass killing was so unlikely to occur within the setting of
modern life that a reasonably prudent business would not consider the
possibility of its occurrence in trying to protect its invitees.192
Lopez is clearly distinguishable from Adam Lanza’s and Jared
Loughner’s case.  First, and significantly, the mass shooting in Lopez oc-
curred in 1984.193  Since then, mass shootings have occurred with much
greater frequency; thus, it can no longer be said in 2016 that a mass killing
is an unlikely or remote occurrence.194  Second, having the foresight that
a stranger entering a business would embark on a killing spree is quite
different than anticipating someone with whom you live—and whom you
know has significant mental health issues and an unusual fascination with
firearms, killing, or mass shootings—may be planning a mass murder of
their own.  Indeed, the law in every jurisdiction reasonably anticipates that
a mentally ill person with a firearm might harm someone, which is why
every jurisdiction has some variation of a law intended to preclude men-
tally ill persons from possessing firearms.195  Accordingly, not only were
Adam Lanza’s and Jared Loughner’s mass killings foreseeable, but it is
more generally foreseeable that any mentally ill person acting as they did
could commit mass murder.
Even if a court reasoned that a mass shooting was unforeseeable in
Adam Lanza’s, Jared Loughner’s, or a future mass shooting case, it does
not mean that no duty can be recognized; foreseeability is a dominant
188. See Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 438 (Ct. App. 1987).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 439.
191. See id. at 445.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 438.
194. See id. at 445.
195. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 341–48.
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consideration in the duty-policy analysis, but it is not the sin qua non.196  A
court can still find that a duty exists if the majority of other policy consid-
erations weigh in favor of recognizing a duty.  Moreover, a minority of
jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which
removes foreseeability completely from the duty calculus.197  This is prob-
ably because no special expertise is required to determine whether some-
thing is foreseeable, since “deciding what is reasonably foreseeable
involves common sense, common experience, and application of the stan-
dards and behavioral norms of the community—matters that have long
been understood to be uniquely the province of the finder of fact.”198
Thus, in these jurisdictions, foreseeability will not even be a factor, much
less a bar, to the recognition of a duty.
b. Other Policy Considerations
The majority of the remaining policy factors weigh in favor of recog-
nizing a parental duty to supervise or control a mentally ill, adult child
residing at home, and if the parents cannot control the child, to warn the
proper authorities (the police, the court, or mental health professionals)
that their adult child has a firearm, is mentally ill, and may be potentially
dangerous.  As previously mentioned, the other policy considerations in-
clude the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the close-
ness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; the policy
of preventing future harm; the extent of the burden to the defendant to
prevent the harm; the consequences to the community of imposing a duty
to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.199  Each will be ad-
dressed in turn.
i. The Degree of Certainty the Plaintiff Suffered Injury
This policy consideration weighs in favor of recognizing a parental
duty to (1) supervise or control mentally ill, adult children residing at
home to prevent them from accessing a firearm or (2) warn the proper
authorities when they do have a gun or have evidenced an intent to com-
mit a mass murder.  Thus, this policy factor without question will always tip
in favor of recognizing a parental duty.
196. See Harnad, supra note 163, § 59; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,
97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 31 (Ct. App. 2000) (noting “foreseeability is not coterminous
with duty”).  Thus, it stands to reason a finding of unforeseeability, standing alone,
will not automatically mandate a finding of no duty.
197. See Weigand, supra note 158, at 64.
198. See A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Neb.
2010).
199. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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ii. The Closeness of the Connection Between the Defendant’s Conduct
and the Injury Suffered
Second, there is a close connection between the defendant’s conduct
of (1) failing to supervise or control an adult, mentally ill child residing
with them or (2) warning the proper authorities of a mentally disturbed
child planning a mass killing or on the loose with a gun, and someone in
the community randomly being shot by that individual.  A recent FBI re-
port shows that almost 70% of mass shooting incidents end before the
police can respond to the scene.200  Indeed, research on mass school
shootings reveal that most foiled school rampage shootings were detected
and prevented because a family member or friend alerted the proper au-
thorities before the would-be perpetrator could execute their plan.201
Parents who reside with their children and observe them on a daily basis
are in the best position to observe their child’s mental state and behavior.
Failure to prevent a mentally ill child from accessing a firearm is strongly
connected to a third party’s injury or death.  Thus, this factor weighs in
favor of recognizing a parental duty in the typical mass shooting case.
iii. The Moral Blame Attached to the Defendant’s Conduct
Third, at least one research study indicates that parents of a mass
shooter are partially morally to blame for their child’s mass shooting be-
cause, prior to its occurrence, the parents had a history of accepting and
accommodating their child’s pathological behavior.  According to this
study, parents of school shooters failed to “react to behavior that most
parents would find very disturbing or abnormal” and minimized their
child’s erratic conduct.202  These parents set no limits on their child’s be-
havior and did not supervise or monitor their child’s use of the In-
ternet.203  The parents also had a turbulent relationship with their child to
the extent that the child expressed contempt for one or more of their
parents and rejected their parents’ role in their lives.204  Finally, the par-
200. See BLAIR & SCHWEIT, supra note 2, at 8–9.
201. See PETER LANGMAN, Ten Lessons Learned from School Shootings and Foiled
Attacks, in WHY KIDS KILL: INSIDE THE MINDS OF SCHOOL SHOOTERS (2014), available
at https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/ten_lessons_1.1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9ENM-QZ2G] (recognizing “[n]umerous students have prevented possi-
ble [school shooting] attacks because they knew enough to report what they heard
to parents or school personnel); see also KATHERINE S. NEWMAN ET AL., RAMPAGE:
THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 59 (2004) (noting that in New York Times
study of 102 rampage killers, “more than half of the cases, friends, family, and even
the offenders themselves tried to get help or warn others about the impending
violence”). See generally MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, FBI, THE SCHOOL SHOOTER: A
THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 21 (2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/school-shooter [https://perma.cc/N7EC-NZYQ].
202. O’TOOLE, supra note 201, at 21.
203. See id. at 22.
204. See id. at 21.
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ents carelessly kept firearms in the home, giving their children unfettered
access to these deadly weapons.205
The commonalities observed among parents of school rampage
shooters in this study are consistent with Nancy Lanza’s case.  Despite ex-
pressing concern over her son’s behavior, including plans to commit him,
Nancy downplayed her son’s behavior and told friends that she was not
afraid Adam would harm her.206  Nancy allowed her son to live in isola-
tion, even permitting him to stay in their home without leaving once for
three months.207  Adam had a strained relationship with both his parents.
He had stopped verbally communicating with them and was estranged
from his only sibling.208  Toward the end, Nancy apparently realized that
her son needed emergency mental health attention and was in the process
of having him involuntarily committed, but she nevertheless left him alone
in their home with numerous firearms that were not securely stored while
she went on vacation.209  While she was away, her son made a practice run
in his car to Newtown where Sandy Hook Elementary School was lo-
cated.210  Shortly thereafter, her son used her firearms to murder the ele-
mentary school children and educators.211  Not only did she provide
Adam with unrestrained access to her firearms, but she also encouraged
his usage of firearms by taking him to shooting ranges and giving him a
check to purchase his own gun for Christmas.212  This was not only mor-
ally reprehensible; it was arguably criminally negligent.  Therefore, this
policy consideration would tip in favor of recognizing a duty in the case of
Adam Lanza’s mother.
However, it is a closer call as to whether this factor would weigh in
favor of finding a duty in the case of Jared Loughner’s parents.  On one
hand, Jared’s parents were warned by Jared’s community college that Ja-
red was mentally unstable, dangerous, and needed a mental health evalua-
tion, yet the parents never followed up or made sure that Jared saw the
mental health professional.  Although they advised him to see one,213 af-
ter Jared refused, they should have given him an ultimatum similar to the
one issued by Jared’s college—seek help or leave.214  Alternatively, they
could have sought involuntary commitment.
205. See id.
206. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 29–30.
209. See id. at 25, 28; Winter, supra note 14.
210. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28.
211. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 322.
212. See SEDENSKY, supra note 10, at 28; Cummings et al., supra note 11.
213. See Wagner, supra note 110.
214. See Helpful Tips for Families: Living with a Mentally Ill Relative–Practical Ad-
vice, NAT’L ALLIANCE MENTAL ILLNESS, http://www.namiyolo.org/tipsforfamilies
.html [https://perma.cc/5E5K-P8GY] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016); see also Donald
Kern, Tough Love and Bipolar Disorder, BIPOLAR BY CHANCE, http://bipolarbychance
.blogspot.com/2009/06/tought-love-and-bipolar-disorder.html [https://perma
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Although not as much information is available on the relationship
between Jared and his parents, one media outlet reported that Jared had a
strained relationship with his parents and claimed that they were
“hassling” him.215 Neighbors described Jared’s father as angry and antago-
nistic towards them and insinuated that he was “crazy.”216
On the other hand, the Loughners did try to supervise Jared and
monitor his whereabouts.217  For instance, Jared had once left home with-
out his parent’s knowledge, and his parents went looking for him.218  The
parents of Jared’s friend told the Loughners Jared was staying at a hotel,
and the Loughners went and retrieved him.219  The parents also took away
Jared’s firearm and disabled his car every night to keep him home in the
evenings,220 although they forgot to disable his car the night before the
shootings.221  Additionally, in the months leading up to the shootings, the
Loughners pleaded with their son to “see someone.”222  Thus, a court
could find that this factor goes either way.
As illustrated by the Loughner and Lanza exemplars, whether the
“moral blame” policy consideration weighs in favor of recognizing a duty
will depend on the specific facts of each mass shooting case.
iv. The Policy of Preventing Future Harm and the Consequences to
the Community of That Harm
Fourth, the policy of preventing future harm also weighs in favor of
finding parents liable for failing to prevent an adult, mentally ill child
from possessing a firearm.  According to a recent FBI report, mass shoot-
.cc/TCE6-MRZZ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016)  (advocating for “tough love” to get a
mentally ill family member to seek treatment, explaining that “[s]ometimes it
means giving an ultimatum of going for treatment or leaving the family home”);
Madison Park & Elizabeth Landau, Warning Signs from a Troubled Mind: What Par-
ents Should Do, CNN (Jan. 14, 2011, 6:09 PM ), http://www.cnn.com/2011/
HEALTH/01/14/mental.health.loughner/index.html [https://perma.cc/KBH7-
9K8T] (reporting how Dr. Charles Raison, psychiatrist at Emory University, recom-
mends giving adult children ultimatums to take their prescribed medication or
leave).
215. Amanda Lee Myers & Justin Pritchard, Jared Loughner’s Parents Devastated,
Neighbor Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/01/11/jared-loughner-parents_n_807479.html [https://perma.cc/W6H9-
L786] (updated May 5, 2011, 6:25 PM).
216. See Martin & Siegel, supra note 104.
217. See id.
218. See Myers & Pritchard, supra note 215.
219. See id.
220. See Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
221. Hipolito Corella, Tucson Shooting: No Mental Health Treatment for Loughner
Before Giffords Rampage, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Mar. 27, 2013, 8:38 AM, http://tucson
.com/news/local/crime/tucson-shooting-no-mental-health-treatment-for-
loughner-before-giffords/article_70b5b03c-96f4-11e2-b7dc-0019bb2963f4.html
[https://perma.cc/XP4W-C439].
222. See Martinez & Carter, supra note 109.
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ings undoubtedly are on the rise.223  It has become an epidemic.  Since an
individual can kill a number of people in a matter of minutes before the
police even arrive on the scene, the best approach to decreasing the inci-
dence of mass shootings is to prevent them before they start, and the best
place to start is in the home.  No one knows a child better than his or her
parent.  Parents are in the best position to evaluate the mental health and
propensity for violence of their child and whether they should have a gun.
Moreover, most mass shootings are committed at schools where inno-
cent children are victimized.224  As one court has recognized, “[o]ur
greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society is our common
goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy, so they may grow to
their full potential and can, in time, take our places in the community at
large.”225  Recognizing a parental duty to control or supervise adult, men-
tally ill children living with them will hopefully encourage more dialogue
on mental illness and what parents should do when dealing with an adult,
mentally ill child—a dialogue that can save lives.  Thus, this policy factor
weighs in favor of recognizing a parental duty to supervise/control adult
children to the extent necessary to prevent them from accessing a firearm
and to warn authorities when they have a gun.  Failure to do so will have
dire consequences for the community.
v. The Extent of the Burden to Prevent the Harm
Fifth, the burden on parents of keeping firearms out of a mentally ill,
emancipated child’s hands is slight.  It does not take much effort to safely
store firearms, or even better, to not have them in the home where a men-
tally ill person lives at all.  Indeed, at least one state has a statute expressly
prohibiting firearms in a house where a mentally ill individual resides.226
Alternatively, parents can take measures to ensure that their child cannot
access firearms by safely storing them in a safe that is only unlocked by the
parents’ fingerprints.  Additionally, the burden on parents of monitoring
an adult child’s activities living in their home is also slight.  For example,
parents can easily search their child’s room for any weapons or writings
suggesting their child is planning something sinister.
vi. The Availability, Cost, and Prevalence of Insurance for the Risk
Involved
This factor can weigh in favor of or against imposition of a duty de-
pending upon the facts of a case.  If the defendant parents own a house,
223. See BLAIR & SCHWEIT, supra note 2, at 20.
224. See id. at 12–13.
225. See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 33 (Ct. App.
2000).
226. Jupin v. Kask, 849 N.E.2d 829, 838–39 (Mass. 2006) (recognizing “the
financial costs of ensuring the proper securing of firearms and the more esoteric
costs involved with requiring certain actions to relieve potential liability—are
modest”).
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insurance may be available because most homeowners’ insurance policies
cover personal injuries caused by the insured’s negligence on their prop-
erty and “on the street[s].”227  Some homeowner’s insurance, however, ex-
pressly excludes criminal acts from coverage,228 and some parents may not
own a home or have any insurance whatsoever.  If no insurance covers the
risk of someone in the household committing a crime like a shooting, this
factor would weigh against recognizing a duty.
vii. Other Policy Considerations
Some may argue that exposing parents to civil liability for the shoot-
ing rampages of their children may dissuade parents from housing their
mentally ill children who already have few options in life, as they often
cannot keep employment and support themselves.  Even if this was true,
this is not necessarily a negative.  A person who is severely mentally ill
and dangerous also poses a danger to their parents with whom they
reside—Adam Lanza is a prime example, as he shot his mother, killing
her, before unleashing his fusillade upon the twenty-six elementary school
children and educators at Sandy Hook.  Thus, it is in the parent’s own best
interest to supervise and control their mentally ill, emancipated offspring
to make sure their children receive mental health assistance and avoid
firearms, and if they cannot control them, to make them leave their resi-
dence or have them involuntarily committed to a mental healthcare facil-
ity.  Finally, perhaps refusing to provide refuge for a severely mentally ill,
adult child who will not accept mental health treatment will force that
child to obtain the medical assistance he or she so desperately needs in
order to have their parents continue to provide food, shelter, and the
other necessities and comforts of life.  Forcing the mentally ill child to
seek professional treatment is also in the individual’s best interest, as mass
shooters often die during a shooting rampage incident, either from a self-
inflicted wound, a bystander, or law enforcement trying to stop the
shooting.229
Second, some may argue that recognizing a duty in cases involving
adult, mentally unstable shooters could unfairly penalize the parents for
having a mentally ill child and further stigmatize mental illness.  After all,
no one is advocating for parental liability in other murder cases (e.g.,
gang-related).  This argument misses the point.  Recognizing a parental
duty in mass shooting cases is based on the widely accepted premise that a
person with significant mental health issues has no business possessing a
227. See Survivor’s Guide to Civil Remedies Against Criminals, ELLIOT GLICKSMAN
PLLC, http://www.glicksmanlaw.com/CM/Custom/Survivors-Guide.asp [https://
perma.cc/DZ4H-MG6C] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) (stating that most homeowners
policies covers personal injuries caused by insured’s negligence on insured’s prop-
erty and “on the street[s]”).
228. See Steven Plitt et al., Risks and Activities Covered by Insurance Policy, 7A
COUCH ON INS. § 103:40 (3d ed. 2015).
229. See BLAIR & SCHWEIT, supra note 2, at 11.
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firearm because, like a minor child, they do not have the mindset to safely
handle such a dangerous instrument.  Severely mentally ill individuals re-
quire the same supervision and monitoring as a minor child.  Parents have
no obligation to support an adult, mentally ill child, but if they do assume
responsibility, they should take the same precautions with them as they
would with a five-year-old child.  In contrast, a parent has no ability to
control an adult, legally emancipated drug dealer or gang member with
no mental illness who is not financially dependent upon them.
Moreover, there are multiple safeguards embedded in the intricate
negligence analysis that will prevent parental liability in mass shooting
cases solely because the parents have a mentally ill son or daughter.  For a
parental duty to arise, the plaintiff has to do more than merely show the
parents were aware of their child’s mental health issues.  Plaintiffs must
prove that the parents also knew or had reason to know their child posed a
risk to the community, and that they had the ability to control the child
before a special relationship—a prerequisite to recognizing a duty and
thus liability—will be found.  Assuming that a special relationship can be
established, the plaintiff must still show a myriad of policy considerations
weigh in favor of recognizing a duty, including the policy consideration
that considers the parents’ blameworthiness.  Thus, a parent will never be
penalized for simply having a mentally ill offspring.
In sum, the majority of policy considerations tip in favor of recogniz-
ing a parental duty, and, therefore, courts should recognize such a duty
under the circumstances described.
IV. PROVING A BREACH OF PARENTAL DUTY
Unlike the issue of whether a duty exists, which is a question of law,
whether there was a breach of that duty is a question of fact for the jury.230
In ascertaining whether a defendant breached any particular duty, the
fact-finder is essentially asking whether the defendant acted reasonably
under the circumstances; in other words, was it reasonably foreseeable
that by acting (or in the case of nonfeasance, not acting), the complained
of harm would result?231
The foreseeability determination in this stage of the negligence analy-
sis is slightly different than the one in the duty-foreseeability test because it
is not just asking whether the third-party adult child’s act—the mass shoot-
ing—was foreseeable generally, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable
that the parents’ misfeasance or nonfeasance created a risk for the mass
shooting to occur.  Part of the analysis to determine whether the defen-
230. See, e.g., Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 545, 549
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
231. See A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 916–18
(Neb. 2010) (adopting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS approach of removing
foreseeability from duty analysis and considering it in context of whether the de-
fendant breached his duty, i.e., acted reasonably).
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dant’s conduct or omission was a breach of duty or, stated differently, a
failure to exercise reasonable care, is considering what a reasonable and
prudent parent would have done.232
Applying this test to Lanzas’ and the Loughners’ cases, a jury could
reasonably find that a breach occurred.  In Nancy’s case, a reasonable and
prudent parent would not give her mentally ill, adult son unlimited access
to a military-style assault rifle and other firearms and most certainly would
not take him to the shooting range or give him funds to purchase his own
gun.  A reasonable and prudent parent would also not leave a son they
had recently planned to have involuntarily committed alone and un-
supervised for a whole weekend with her guns,233 as it is foreseeable that
he could use those weapons to harm himself or someone in the general
public.  What a reasonable and prudent parent would have done in
Nancy’s case is completely deny their mentally ill son access to their guns
by safely storing the weapons or not having guns at all in the house.  A
reasonable and prudent person would not have left their severely mentally
ill child—who had not left the house in months—alone and unsupervised.
A reasonable and prudent person would have sought immediate mental
health assistance for their child, even involuntary commitment, before
leaving town.  At the very least, Nancy could have given Adam an ultima-
tum, as some mental health professionals have recommended, to seek
help or get out.234
Likewise, a jury could find that the Loughners did not exercise rea-
sonable care.  A reasonable and prudent parent in their case would have
forced their child to obtain an evaluation from a mental health care pro-
fessional upon their child being suspended from college for displaying
mentally disturbing behavior.235 The Loughners themselves witnessed Ja-
red’s profound, yet professionally undiagnosed, mental illness when they
observed him engaging in incomprehensible and nonsensical rants and
being nonverbal.236  Despite being concerned about his erratic and angry
behavior,237 they never took the community college’s advice to have Jared
evaluated.238  One could argue that after Jared refused to be evaluated, a
232. See Doe Parents No. 1 v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 58 P.3d 545, 593 (Haw.
2002).
233. See id.
234. See Kern, supra note 214; Park & Landau, supra note 214.
235. See Martin & Siegel, supra note 104; see also Bob Orr, Newly Released Jared
Lee Loughner Files Reveal Chilling Details, CBS NEWS (Mar. 27, 2013, 7:12 PM), http:/
/www.cbsnews.com/news/newly-released-jared-lee-loughner-files-reveal-chilling-
details/ [https://perma.cc/UXM5-R9AH].
236. See Dan Barry, Looking Behind the Mug-Shot Grin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/us/16loughner.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/
623M-UDJA]; Loughner CBS Article, supra note 112.
237. See Loughner CBS Article, supra note 112 (explaining how parents were
so disturbed by Jared’s behavior they believed he was on drugs and tested him for
narcotics but test came back negative); Orr, supra note 235.
238. See Orr, supra note 235.
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reasonable parent would have had him involuntarily evaluated by a hospi-
tal or committed to a mental health healthcare facility, just as Nancy Lanza
should have done in Adam’s case.  Alternatively, they could have given
him an ultimatum to get help or leave because it was foreseeable that
someone with untreated mental illness would harm others.
V. CAUSATION
Establishing a breach of duty is one thing, proving a causal connec-
tion between the defendant-parents’ breach of duty and the resulting
harm, is quite another.  Like the issue of whether there was a breach, the
question of whether the defendant’s breach caused the complained of
harm is a question of fact for the jury that calls for a foreseeability
determination.239
Jurisdictions vary on what test should be applied to ascertain whether
the defendant’s negligent act caused the complained of injury.  Tradition-
ally, most states require the plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s con-
duct was both (1) the cause-in-fact of the complained of injury and (2) the
proximate or legal cause.240  In ascertaining whether the defendant’s con-
duct was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury, most jurisdictions em-
ploy the “but-for” test.241  In other words, would the mass shooting have
occurred but for the defendant-parents’ negligence?  “The but-for test
[only] applies in cases where only one negligent act is at issue.”242  If more
than one negligent act is at issue, then the “substantial factor” test applies,
which considers if it is more likely than not that the defendant’s conduct
was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries.243  Some
states, however, have used the substantial factor test when only one negli-
gent act is at issue, adding to analytical confusion surrounding this
element.244
Regardless of what test is used for cause-in-fact, a jury could find that
Nancy Lanza’s and the Loughners’ breach of duty was the cause-in-fact for
their children’s mass shootings.  As to Nancy Lanza, but-for her giving her
son unfettered access to her firearms, the mass shooting would not have
occurred.  Adam used her .223-caliber Bushmaster Model XM15 semi-au-
tomatic firearm, known as a “killing machine,” to commit his heinous
239. See Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., 15 N.E.3d 545, 549 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2014).
240. See, e.g., Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 973 A.2d 771, 786–87 (Md. Ct. App.
2009); Fisher v. Swift Transp. Co., 181 P.3d 601, 609 (Mont. 2008); Baggerly v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (S.C. 2006); see also Weigand, supra note 158, at
62.
241. See Michael Panella, Problematic Legal Causations of Death, 44 TENN. B.J.,
Feb. 2008, at 21, 22; see also Baggerly, 635 S.E.2d at 101.
242. See Pittway Corp., 973 A.2d at 786–87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. See id.
244. See David Jakubowitz, “Help, I’ve Fallen and Can’t Get Up!”: New York’s Appli-
cation of the Substantial Factor Test, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 593, 606
(2004).
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acts.245  Under federal law, you must be at least twenty-one years old to
legally purchase any firearm other than a rifle or shotgun,246 and Adam
was only nineteen years old.  Thus, Adam could not have legally purchased
the military-style weapon he used on most of the victims on his own.  Also,
but for Nancy Lanza leaving Adam unsupervised and failing to have him
involuntarily committed to a mental institution, he would not have had
the opportunity to make a practice run to Sandy Hook and commit the
murders.
Regarding Jared Loughner, arguably but-for his parents’ failure to
have him evaluated and treated by a mental health professional, he would
not have committed the murders.  After Loughner was charged with the
mass shooting, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia.247  Studies reveal
people with serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia who do not take
their medication are more dangerous than the general population.248  A
jury could find the Loughners’ failure to ensure their son received treat-
ment for his mental illness was the cause-in-fact for the mass shootings.
Once a plaintiff proves that the defendant’s conduct was the cause-in-
fact of the injury, the fact-finder must move to the second part of the anal-
ysis—whether the defendant’s conduct was the proximate or legal cause of
the injuries, which is based upon whether the harm was foreseeable.249
The foreseeability mandated here asks if, in retrospect, the injury emanat-
ing from the act or omission should have been reasonably anticipated.250
In other words, the inquiry focuses on whether the injury was a natural
245. See Lee Ferran & Shushannah Walshe, Newtown Massacre: What Is a Bush-
master .223?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/new-
town-massacre-bushmaster-223/story?id=18000884 [https://perma.cc/3PH5-
MCWZ] (internal quotation marks omitted); Edgar Sandoval & Corky Siemaszko,
Inside Adam Lanza’s Lair: Newtown Shooter Plotted Own Death, Obsessed with Columbine
Shooting, Report Details, DAILY NEWS (Nov. 26, 2013, 4:06 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/national/newtown-shooter-planned-death-obsessed-columbine-ar
ticle-1.1528626 [https://perma.cc/TW6Y-MYH7].
246. See 18 U.S.C. §922(b)(1) (2012).
247. See Katie Moisse, Jared Loughner’s Defense Team May Be Looking for Mental
Illness in His Relatives, ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
MindMoodNews/jared-loughner-mental-illness-runs-families/story?id=14332522
[https://perma.cc/7QL9-RMBS].
248. See Katherine B. Cook, Note, Revising Assisted Outpatient Treatment Statutes
in Indiana: Providing Mental Health Treatment for Those in Need, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
661, 669–71 (2012) (stating several studies suggest that one important predictor of
future violence among severely mentally ill is non-adherence to medication); see
also E. Fuller Torrey, Violence and Schizophrenia, 88 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 3 (2006)
(explaining that severely mentally ill persons, like schizophrenics, who do not take
their medication are more dangerous than people in general public); E. Fuller
Torrey, Violence and People with Mental Illness, MENTAL ILLNESS POL’Y ORG. (1994),
available at http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/consequences/violence-statistics.html
[https://perma.cc/6CSQ-SLYB] (same).
249. See Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 973 A.2d 771, 787–88 (Md. Ct. App. 2009);
Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (S.C. 2006).
250. See Baggerly, 635 S.E.2d at 101.
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and probable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.251  Stated differ-
ently, the harm or injury cannot be a “freakish” consequence of the defen-
dant’s act, making the victim of the harm unforeseeable.252  The
landmark case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company,253 clearly makes
this point.
In Palsgraf, the court held that a passenger who was waiting for a train
on the other side of the platform was not a foreseeable victim of the rail-
way guard’s act of helping a passenger board a train by pushing him.254
Unbeknownst to the guard, the passenger was holding a package of fire-
works that was covered in newspaper.255  The passenger dropped the
package, the fireworks fell on the rails and exploded, and the explosion
threw down some scales on the other end of the platform that struck and
injured the plaintiff.256  The court essentially held that the woman stand-
ing far away was not a foreseeable victim; if the guard committed a wrong,
it was committed against the passenger holding the package of
fireworks.257
Applying Palsgraf and the other causation principles to the Lanza and
Loughner cases, a jury could arguably find that random people being shot
by a mentally ill child was a natural and probable consequence of giving
that child a gun in Nancy Lanza’s case and of leaving their child’s mental
illness untreated in both cases.  Guns are “inherently dangerous instru-
mentalit[ies], the use of which is likely to produce death or serious in-
jury.”258  Firearms are even more dangerous when left in the hands of a
mentally unstable person.  Indeed, that is why there are both federal and
state laws aimed at precluding mentally ill persons from possessing fire-
arms,259 laws the United States Supreme Court has recognized place a rea-
sonable restriction on the Second Amendment right to bear arms.260
Thus, the shooting of innocent victims by a mentally ill, adult child is a
natural and probable consequence of parents of that child failing to ade-
quately supervise or control the child by not preventing them from acces-
sing firearms and of not forcing their child to obtain mental health
treatment.
251. See id.
252. See Lee S. Kreindler et al., Foreseeability as a Factor in Proximate Cause, 14
N.Y. PRAC. SERIES, N.Y. L. TORTS § 8:8 (West 2015).
253. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
254. See id. at 340–41.
255. See id. at 341.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. Byers v. Hubbard, 669 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); see also
Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 1997).
259. See Lewis, supra note 2, at 341–47.
260. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (stating “nothing in our opin-
ion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession
of firearms by . . . the mentally ill”).
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On the other hand, both parties could argue that the victims of the
shootings were unforeseeable.  In Nancy Lanza’s case, who could predict
that her son would shoot children and school personnel at an elementary
school he did not attend?  In the Loughners’ case, who could foresee that
their son would shoot Congresswoman Giffords and her constituents wait-
ing to see her at the grocery store?261  Again, as one court has recognized,
albeit in the context of determining foreseeability in the duty context, it is
foreseeable that a member of the general public could be a victim of a
severely mentally ill person with a gun.262  Moreover, this is not a case
where the perpetrators committed their mass shootings hundreds of miles
away from where they lived; the crimes occurred in their own communi-
ties.  Therefore, a jury could find that the victims were foreseeable and the
causation element is met.
Additionally, in cases involving more than one negligent act, like mass
shooting cases, an extra analytical step is required.  Specifically, the fact-
finder must inquire if an independent, intervening negligent act relieves
the defendant of liability.263  An “independent, intervening” negligent act
is “a force that comes into motion after the defendant’s negligent act, and
combines with the negligent act to cause injury to the plaintiff.”264  Signifi-
cantly, if the intervening act was foreseeable, then it does not break the
causal chain between the defendant’s conduct and the injury.265  If the
intervening act is unforeseeable because it is so remote or extraordinary
that it could not have been reasonably anticipated, it is a superseding
cause that breaks the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the
injury—therefore, absolving the defendant(s) from liability.266  Whether
an intervening act is foreseeable is also a question of fact that should be
left to the jury’s province.267  Third-party criminal conduct is a supersed-
ing cause unless it should have been reasonably anticipated.268
In the Lanza and Loughner cases, it should have been reasonably an-
ticipated that the adult children would shoot someone with a gun if their
parents did not adequately monitor, supervise, or control their behavior to
261. After the shootings, material indicating Jared’s hatred and obsession
with Giffords was found in his safe, but it is unknown whether his parents were
aware of this material.  In fact, Jared’s father said that he came across some of
Jared’s writing in a journal and found it indecipherable.
262. See Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 856 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev.
granted in part, cause remanded by 477 N.W.2d 713 (Minn. 1991).
263. See Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 973 A.2d 771, 788–89 (Md. Ct. App. 2009).
264. Fisher v. Swift Transp. Co., 181 P.3d 601, 609 (Mont. 2008).
265. See id.
266. Paul M. Coltoff et al., Proximate Causation, 65 C.J.S. NEGLIGENCE § 223
(West 2015).
267. See Fisher, 181 P.3d at 610.
268. See Spears v. Coffee, 153 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Tex. App. Ct. 2004); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).  It appears that an intervening
cause is interchangeable with superseding causes.
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prevent them from accessing firearms.  Thus, a jury could find in these
cases and future similar cases that the causation element was satisfied.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, it is clear that pursuant to general negligence principles,
some parents can be found negligent and civilly liable for an act or omis-
sion that results in their adult child taking a gun and committing a mass
killing.  In determining whether a parent acted reasonably, common sense
should prevail.  Any reasonable and prudent parent knows, or should
know, that their mentally ill child, regardless of their age, should not have
access to a firearm, as an armed, mentally unstable person poses a serious
risk to the public at large as well as to themselves.  Thus, if a parent is
going to assume responsibility for supervising an adult, mentally ill child,
they have a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care.
Exercising reasonable care includes not having firearms in a house
where a mentally ill person resides, or at the very least, safely storing fire-
arms.  It also entails monitoring your mentally ill child and being on the
lookout for anything that might suggest they are planning to harm others,
such as violent writings, Internet postings, manifestos, ammunition, and
guns.  If a parent believes their child poses an immediate threat to the
public, they should contact the proper authorities.269  Indeed, if a specific
threat is made, they must contact the police upon pain of possibly being
sued.270  Additionally, a reasonable, prudent parent will also insist that
their child obtain mental health assistance, and if the child refuses, the
parents should do everything they can to make sure their child receives
the professional help needed, including threatening to no longer support
the child if they do not seek help, taking away their car keys and other
privileges to encourage compliance, and initiating involuntary commit-
ment to a mental institution when all else fails.271
Parenting is unquestionably the most difficult and important job on
earth, which is probably why courts have historically shied away from hold-
ing parents liable for their children’s actions.  However, the law has long
been involved in judging parents and penalizing them for poor parental
decisions.  For instance, courts have evaluated whether a parent’s use of
corporal punishment is reasonable and excessive, and if it is found to be
excessive, a parent can be civilly liable or lose custody of their child.272  A
269. See Hutchison, supra note 110 (explaining how psychiatrists advise family
members to alert proper authorities if their loved one is committing worrisome
behavior or has made specific threat of violence).
270. See id.
271. Helpful Tips for Families, supra note 214 (advising that “[i]t may be neces-
sary to push your relative into treatment in spite of his angry response”).
272. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Santa Clara Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 167 Cal. Rptr.
3d 148, 160 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting “parents are privileged to administer reasona-
ble punishment with impunity, but the parent who exceeds that limit . . . commits
a battery and is civilly liable for the consequences”  (alteration in original) (inter-
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mother was arrested for leaving her nine-year-old child in the park un-
supervised while she worked at McDonald’s.273  Accordingly, the law
should expect a certain standard of care from parents of adult children
with mental illness and penalize them when they do not act reasonably
with regard to that child if that child lives in the home and they have
assumed a de facto guardianship over them.  It not only takes a village to
raise a child, but a village to stop a mass killing,274 and the most important
villager is a parent—our first line of defense.
nal quotation marks omitted)); In re T.A., 663 N.W.2d 225, 229 (S.D. 2003) (af-
firming trial court’s decision to remove special needs child, who was spanked with
belt and received bruises, from home because there was sufficient evidence child
was abused and neglected).
273. See Kelly Wallace, Mom Arrested for Leaving 9-Year Old Alone at Park, CNN
(July 21, 2014, 4:41 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/21/living/mom-arrested-
left-girl-park-parents/ [https://perma.cc/R4DH-ETUN].
274. See O’TOOLE, supra note 201 (discussing letter from Attorney General
Janet Reno noting that federal government agencies have shown that “if communi-
ties, schools, government and other key players pull together to address the roots
of violence, we can make America safer for our children”).
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